Match-fixing under competitive odds

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Abstract

Two bookmakers compete in Bertrand fashion while setting odds on the outcomes of a sporting contest where an influential punter (or betting syndicate) may bribe some player(s) to fix the contest. Zero profit and bribe prevention may not always hold together. When the influential punter is quite powerful, the bookies may coordinate on prices and earn positive profits for fear of letting the ‘lemons’ (i.e., the influential punter) in. On the other hand, sometimes the bookies make zero profits but also admit match-fixing. When match-fixing occurs, it often involves bribery of only the strong team. The theoretical analysis is intended to address the problem of growing incidence of betting related corruption in world sports including cricket, horse races, tennis, soccer, basketball, wrestling, snooker, etc.

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1. Introduction

\textit{Match-fixing} and gambling related corruption often grab news headlines. Almost any sport – horse races, tennis, soccer, cricket, to name a few – is susceptible to negative external influences.\textsuperscript{1} Someone involved in betting on a specific sporting event may have access to

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\textsuperscript{1}See “Race-fixing probed in Fallon trial” and similar reports at http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/sports/racefixing+probed+in+fallon+trial+/894147. See also a BBC panorama on this subject (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2290356.stm).

For tennis, see reports such as “Tennis chiefs battle match-fixers” and “ITF working with ATP, WTA and Grand Slam Committee to halt match-fixing in tennis” (http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/tennis/7035003.stm; http://www.signonsandiego.com/sports/20071009-0552-ten-tennis-gambling.html).

In March 2009, Uefa president Michel Platini publicly issued the following warning: “There is a grave danger in the world of football and that is match-fixing.” Uefa general secretary says, “We are setting up this betting fraud detection system across Europe to include 27,000 matches in the first and second division in each national association.” See http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/europe/7964790.stm. Latest, police carried out 50 raids in Germany, the UK, Switzerland and Austria: “Prosecutors believe a 200-strong criminal gang has bribed players, coaches, referees and officials to fix games and then made money by betting
player(s) and induce underperformance through bribery. In high visibility sports many unsuspecting punters, bookmakers and the general viewing public may therefore be defrauded in the process.²

When there is a real threat of match-fixing, how do bookmakers respond when their only instruments are the betting odds they set on the competing teams’ wins? Would they set odds so that a match-fixer is discouraged from fixing the match? Ordinarily bookmakers can be expected to price aggressively, but with potential match-fixing in the background such aggressive price competition can be tricky: it makes one of the teams vulnerable to significant betting by the match-fixer. Fearing this the bookmakers may abstain from price cutting, or competitive forces could still prevail lowering odds to trigger match-fixing. Which outcome is more likely to happen and when? Also, how damaging is match-fixing to the bookmakers in terms of profits? Competition usually means less profits. Is it any different with match-fixing?

In this paper, we develop a model of bribery and corruption in sports to address the above questions. We adapt the horse race betting models due to Shin (1991; 1992) to analyze match-fixing in team or individual sporting contests. In Shin (1991) a monopolist bookmaker sets odds on each one of two horses winning a race, whereas in Shin (1992) two bookmakers simultaneously set odds, as in Bertrand competition, in an n-horse race game (n > 2).³ In both models, there is an insider who knows precisely which horse would win the race, while the remaining are noise punters with their different exogenous beliefs about the horses’ winning probabilities that are uncorrelated with the true probabilities. The bookmaker(s) know only the true winning probabilities.⁴

Rather than assuming an insider who knows before betting the identity of the winner (as in Shin’s models), we consider the prospect of a gambler influencing the contestants’ winning on the results.” See the report (dated 20 November, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8370748.stm.


²Corruption in sports has been only occasionally highlighted by economists without the consideration of its causal relationship to betting – see Duggan and Levitt (2002), and Preston and Szymanski (2003). Strumpf (2003), Winter and Kukuk (2008), and Wolfers (2006) are few exceptions.

³To be precise, Shin’s (1992) price-setting game is slightly different from one-shot Bertrand game: the bookmakers first submit bids specifying a maximum combined price for bets on all the horses, the low bidder wins and then sets prices for individual bets so that the total for all bets combined does not exceed the winning bid.

⁴In an empirical framework, Shin (1993) provides estimates for the incidence of insider trading in UK betting markets.
odds through bribery and match-fixing. Ex ante (before bribing), this gambler, to be called the ‘influential punter’, is no better informed than the bookmakers and is less privileged than Shin’s insider. However, different from Shin’s framework, the influential punter may become better informed than the bookmakers through his secret dealings with one of the contestants, if chance presents it and bookmakers’ odds make it worthwhile. Thus, we shift the focus from the use of insider information (i.e. pure adverse selection) to manipulative action that generates inside information for the influential gambler. As actions are choices, our bookmakers can control these by appropriately setting their odds – a possibility absent in models of pure adverse selection such as Shin’s.

Moreover, there is an issue of legality. While betting on the basis of inside information may not be illegal, match-fixing through bribery clearly is. However, the dominant focus of the theoretical literature on betting so far (including Shin’s works) has been to explain the empirical regularity of the favorite-longshot bias in race-track betting. We raise concern about the unfairness of contests due to match-fixing not only for the sake of unsuspecting bettors but also for the viewing public and the media that rely on the public’s interest in sports.

Our model involves two bookmakers (or bookies) and two types of punters (ordinary/naive and influential). The bookies set fixed odds and the punters place bets on the outcome of a sporting contest between two teams (or contestants). The influential punter (or equivalently a large betting syndicate), who shares the same beliefs as the bookies (and the players) about the teams’ winning chances, may be able to gain access to some members in one of the teams and bribe them to sabotage the team. When bribing a team, the influential punter would place a bet on the other team. The anti-corruption authority may investigate the losing team and punish the match-fixing punter and the corrupt player(s) whenever it catches them.

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5 Ottaviani and Sorensen (2008) is a detailed survey of alternative explanations.

6 In a parimutuel market setting, Winter and Kukuk (2008) allow a participant jockey to underperform, but they do not consider enforcement: the cheating jockey does not face the prospect of being found out for the deliberate underperformance. Winter-Kukuk model is not thus adequately rich to analyze cheating incentives formally in the style of standard cheating/punishment models.

7 Fixed-odds betting, as opposed to parimutuel betting, is a more relevant format for analysis of match-fixing where bookies play a significant role without direct involvement in the act of bribery and/or placement of surrogate bets. For a contrast between how odds are set (or determined) in these two betting markets (but without the issues of match-fixing), see Ottaviani and Sorensen (2005).

8 In contests involving rival firms or lobbies, sabotage is a well-studied theme; see, for instance, Konrad (2000). Our sports contest model is much simpler than the ‘effort contest’ games (such as the one analyzed by Konrad) in that we assume exogenous winning probabilities of the contestants due to their inherent skills (or characteristics), and sabotage is a deliberate underperformance relative to one’s own skills.

9 The law enforcement is one of investigation rather than monitoring (Mookherjee and Png, 1992).
With the threat of match-fixing looming, in selecting odds the bookies take into account both the benefit and the danger of undercutting each other. When the influential punter cannot place too large a bet, the following results occur. If, \textit{ex ante}, teams are relatively more even, competition yields zero expected profits for the bookies without attracting the risk of bribery and match-fixing: prices of both the tickets corresponding to fair odds tend to be too high for the influential punter to bribe and bet.\textsuperscript{10} But if (\textit{ex ante}) teams are more uneven, Bertrand competition cannot guarantee elimination of bribery; the bookies make zero profits and the influential punter earns rent. Match-fixing will occur with positive probability, and it can be attributed to \textit{opportunism}. If undercutting triggers match-fixing, its adverse impact (loss) is shared by both bookies, but if match-fixing is not triggered then the gain is exclusive (positive profit). Whenever match-fixing occurs, it involves bribery of only the strong team.

On the other hand, when the influential punter can place a significantly large bet, the adverse impact of match-fixing could be so severe that undercutting becomes very risky. In particular, in contests that are \textit{ex ante} nearly even, the bookies will coordinate on prices strictly above fair odds and sustain, non-cooperatively, positive profits and prevent bribery. Positive profits seem to go against common wisdoms of competition. Here, the \textit{fear} of triggering (the ‘lemons’ of) match-fixing forces the bookies to coordinate on prices. Ironically, without the corrupting influential punter the bookies would compete away profits. There is also another possibility that the bookies set prices inducing bribery of either team and make zero expected profits. With this latter equilibrium, the chance of match-fixing remains rather high (as the influential punter will bribe whenever he has an access to a team) and ticket prices are set above the respective teams’ uncorrupted winning odds to make up for the potential loss to the match-fixing punter. It is difficult to cleanly predict, though, which of the two equilibria – positive profit bribe prevention or zero profit match-fixing – is likely to happen.

A natural question to ask is what happens if there is only one bookmaker. In those instances where competition increases the risk of match-fixing, avoidance of competition should reduce this risk. However, in some of these situations the monopolist may have a perverse incentive to encourage match-fixing and thus gain from the defrauded naive punters. Analysis of the monopoly case involves different complexities and we comment on some likely results towards the end of section 4.

Before we proceed to detailed analysis, we would like to note that in practice bookmakers are well aware of the potential risks of the influential punter’s involvement and as a precaution

\textsuperscript{10}In Shin (1991; 1992), prices exaggerate the odds.
they may limit the size of trades at posted prices.\textsuperscript{11} Even more, the bookmakers may set new odds seeing the increasing volume of bets being placed on a particular outcome so that the influential punter may face a quantity-price trade-off. Further, odds revisions may generate and disseminate new information even among the ordinary punters leading to an erosion of the value of insider information, similar to the market micro structure literature (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985). While our model does not incorporate these features employed in models of financial economics, we do not see the basic insights of our analysis changing qualitatively even if a more sophisticated and much more complex model were formulated. We also assume exogenous investigation probabilities and fines by the prosecution authorities, to keep the analysis tractable. Nor do we model the role of sports bodies that may regulate the betting market in large to prevent cheating. These considerations are important no doubt, but beyond the scope of the present work.

In section 2 we present the model, followed by an analysis of the betting and bribing decisions in section 3. In section 4 we analyze the Bertrand duopoly competition. Section 5 concludes. The formal proofs appear in the Appendix.

\section{The Model}

There are two bookmakers, called the bookies, who set the odds on each of two teams winning a competitive sports match (equivalently, set the prices of two tickets); the match being drawn is not a possibility. Ticket $i$ with price $\pi_i$ yields a dollar whenever team $i$ wins the contest and yields nothing if team $i$ loses, with $0 \leq \pi_1, \pi_2 \leq 1$. To keep the notations simple, bookie indices will be omitted from the prices.

There are a continuum of naive punters, to be described as \textit{punters} or sometimes \textit{ordinary punters}, parameterized by individual belief (i.e., the probability) $q$ that team 1 will win ($1 - q$ is the probability that team 2 will win); $q$ is distributed ‘uniformly’ over (0, 1). Ordinary punters stubbornly stick to their beliefs.

There is also a knowledgeable and potentially corrupt/influential punter, to be referred as punter $I$, who may influence a team’s winning chances by bribing its corruptible players to underperform. Punter $I$ gains access to team $i$ with probability $0 \leq \mu_i \leq 1$; with probability $1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2$, he fails to gain any access. At best, punter $I$ can access only one team. The bookies and the prosecution authority know only $(\mu_1, \mu_2)$.

The distribution of ordinary punters’ wealth is ‘uniform’ over [0, 1], with a collective wealth of $y$ dollars; the wealth of punter $I$ is $z = 1 - y$ dollars.

\textsuperscript{11}This may be difficult to implement, however, as any corrupt betting syndicate may have multiple punters on its team.
In the absence of any external influence, the probability that team 1 will win is $0 < p_1 < 1$ and the corresponding probability for team 2 is $p_2 = 1 - p_1$. The bookies, punter $I$, and the players – all initially observe the draw $p_1$.\textsuperscript{12} The prosecution need not observe $p_1$. Even when the prosecution observes $p_1$, it does not employ sophisticated game-theoretic reasoning to infer if match-fixing has occurred given the betting odds and $p_1$.

The prosecution authority (or ACU, anti-corruption unit) investigates team $i$ only when team $i$ loses the contest. Assume that the probability of investigation of team $i$, $0 < \alpha_i < 1$, is known to all, and the investigation detects bribery, if any, with probability one. The investigation probability may differ across teams.\textsuperscript{13} Given our focus on the bookies’ pricing strategies, we take the prosecution to be a non-strategic rule-book follower.

On conviction, the corrupt player (or players) will be imposed a total fine $0 < f \leq \bar{f}$ and punter $I$ is fined $0 < f_I \leq \bar{f}$.\textsuperscript{14}

When punter $I$ gets access to team $i$, by making a bribe promise of $b_i$ conditional on team $i$ losing he can lower the probability of team $i$ winning from the true probability $p_i$ to $\lambda_i p_i$, where $0 \leq \lambda_i < 1$, provided the corrupt players of team $i$ cooperate with punter $I$ in undermining the team performance. $\lambda_i$ depends on the susceptibility to corruption and bribery of team $i$’s members, i.e., whether a small or a significant section of the team takes part in undermining the team cause. Also, the particular player (or players) to whom punter $I$ is likely to have an access may be of varied importance to the team’s overall performance. We take $\lambda_i$ to be exogenous and common knowledge.

The bookies, two types of punters and the corruptible team members – all are assumed to be risk-neutral and maximize their respective expected profits/payoffs. Define the ‘betting and bribery’ game, $\Gamma$, as follows:

\textsuperscript{12}Levitt (2004) recognizes that bookmakers are usually more skilled at predicting match outcomes than ordinary punters. In any case, without such confidence in abilities the bookies won’t be in the business.

\textsuperscript{13}This difference could be due to the teams’ different susceptibility to corruption.

\textsuperscript{14}The finding of bribery is assumed to reveal the identity of punter $I$. Such an assumption may not be unrealistic, as the enforcement authority is unlikely to let go the trail of bribery that they come to unearth. Alternatively, the bookies can alert enforcement authorities to unusually high bets placed by particular punters who then may be investigated to see any potential link to the players. There are instances of bookmaking firms voiding bets in tennis suspecting wrongdoing; see several reports in The Independent, a UK newspaper, including “Wimbledon on high alert over suspected match-fixing rings” (18 June, 2009). This particular report mentions three Betfair customers placing bets of the order of $540,942, $368,036 and $253,833 on a 2007 tennis match between Nikolay Davidenko (No. 5 in world ranking) and Martin Vassallo Arguello (ranked 87th) in favor of Arguello, who then went on to win the match; see also http://www-timesonline-co-uk-tol-sport-tennis-article6515314-ece for a similar instance of voiding of bets on another tennis match by the bookmaking firm, William Hill. For instances in snooker and football, refer http://www-independent-co-uk-sport-general-others-sports-betting-age-of-complacency-over-as-sport-wakes-up-to-gambling-risk-1638381.html.
**Stage 1.** Nature draws $p_1$ and reveals it to the bookies, punter $I$ and the players; the ordinary punters draw their respective private signals $q$. Then the bookies simultaneously announce the prices ($\pi_1, \pi_2$).

**Stage 2.** Punter $I$ learns about his access to team 1 or team 2 or neither, and subsequently decides whether to bribe the team or not (in the event of gaining access).

**Stage 3.** The ordinary punters as well as punter $I$ place bets according to their ‘eventual’ beliefs. When the bookies charge the same price for a given ticket, market is evenly shared, and when they charge unequal prices, lower price captures the whole market. The match is played out according to winning probabilities ($p_1, 1 - p_1$) or ($\lambda_1 p_1, 1 - \lambda_1 p_1$) (where team 1 is bribed), or ($1 - \lambda_2 p_2, \lambda_2 p_2$) (where team 2 is bribed) and the outcome of the match is determined.

**Stage 4.** Finally, the ACU follows its investigation policy, $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$. On successful investigation, fines are imposed on the corrupt player(s) and punter $I$.

See also Fig. 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$p_1$ drawn</th>
<th>prices</th>
<th>$I$’s access</th>
<th>bribery?</th>
<th>match played</th>
<th>ACU exams</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>posted</td>
<td>to teams</td>
<td>bets placed</td>
<td>bets settled</td>
<td>penalties apply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1: Time line**

Thus the bookies move simultaneously in stage 1, then punter $I$ decides on bribery in stage 2 followed by betting in stage 3 and finally the prosecution moves, defining the extensive form. Simultaneous moves (in stage 1) and punter $I$’s betting based on privately held beliefs about the teams’ winning odds make the game an imperfect information game between the two bookies and punter $I$. So we will solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) strategies in prices, bribery and betting.

3. Betting and Bribing Decisions

3.1 Ordinary Punters’ Betting Decision

The ordinary punters adopt the following betting rule:

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15 The timing of the influential punter’s access to teams (after or before the odds are posted) is not going to matter. What is important is that the bookies do not know whether, or to which team, the influential punter will have an access.

16 This is same as the betting rule by the Outsiders in Shin (1991).
If $q \geq \pi_1$ but $1 - q < \pi_2$, bet on team 1;
If $1 - q \geq \pi_2$ but $q < \pi_1$, bet on team 2;
If $q \geq \pi_1$ and $1 - q \geq \pi_2$, then bet on team 1 if $\frac{q}{\pi_1} \geq \frac{1-q}{\pi_2}$ and bet on team 2 if $\frac{q}{\pi_1} \leq \frac{1-q}{\pi_2}$;
If $q < \pi_1$ and $1 - q < \pi_2$, do not bet on either team.

### 3.2 Player Incentives for Bribe-taking and Sabotage

Given the prosecution’s investigation strategy, let us consider the incentives of players to accept bribes. In a team context, the incentives concern the corruptible member(s) of a team. We assume a single corruptible member in each team; the analysis applies equally to a consortium of corruptible members. Suppose the corruptible player of team $i$ (with whom punter $I$ establishes contact) gets the reward $w$ in the event team $i$ wins, and receives nothing if team $i$ loses.\(^{17}\) Given any belief $p_i$, a bribe $b_i$ is accepted and honored by the corruptible player by underperforming

\[ (\lambda_ip_i)w + (1-\lambda_ip_i)(b_i - \alpha_if) \geq p_iw + (1-p_i)(b_i - \alpha_if) \]

i.e., if and only if

\[ b_i \geq w + \alpha_if. \]  \hspace{1cm} (1)

A player can renege on his promise to underperform even after entering into an agreement with punter $I$. The right-hand side of (1) recognizes this possibility. A player will be penalized for taking bribes, even if he might not have deliberately underperformed.\(^{18}\)

The minimum bribe required to induce the corruptible player to accept the bait is $b_i = w + \alpha_if$. That is, the reservation bribe covers the loss of the prize $w$ and the expected penalty. We assume that punter $I$ holds all the bargaining power so that $b_i = b_i$.\(^{19}\)

### 3.3 Influential Punter’s Betting and Bribing Incentives

First consider the betting incentives. Having learnt the true probabilities $p_i$ and observed the prices $\pi_i$ ($i = 1, 2$), if punter $I$ fails to contact either team or decides not to bribe,

he will bet $z$ on team $i$ if $\frac{p_i}{\pi_i} \geq \max\{1, \frac{p_j}{\pi_j}\}, \ i \neq j$, \(^{20}\)

and will bet on neither if $\frac{p_i}{\pi_i} < 1, \ i = 1, 2$.

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\(^{17}\)The prize $w$ includes both direct and indirect rewards, with the latter in the form of lucrative endorsement opportunities for commercials. The player may additionally receive unconditional retainer wage/appearance fee that does not affect the player’s bribe-taking incentives. In the case of a two-player contest such as tennis, the index $i$ will refer to the player, with $w_i$ reflecting the particular player’s reputation/stake.

\(^{18}\)To prove that a player has deliberately underperformed is very difficult. On the other hand, bribery can be established based on hard evidence.

\(^{19}\)Our analysis can be easily extended to bargaining over bribe.
The expected profit to punter I from betting exclusively on team $i$ is $E\Pi^I_{0i} = p_i \frac{z}{\pi_i} - z$, $i = 1, 2$, and zero when he bets on neither.\textsuperscript{21} His expected profit from not bribing is $\max\{E\Pi^I_{0i}, E\Pi^I_{0j}, 0\}$.

If, however, punter I contacts a corruptible member of team $i$, offers him a bribe and places a bet on team $j$, his expected profit equals: $E\Pi^I(b_i) = (1 - \lambda_i p_i) \left[ \frac{z}{\pi_j} - b_i - \alpha_i f_I \right] - z$.

Substituting $b_i = w + \alpha_i f$, 
\[
E\Pi^I(b_i) = (1 - \lambda_i p_i) z \left[ \frac{1}{\pi_j} - \Omega_i \right] - z = (1 - \lambda_i p_i) z \left[ \frac{1}{\pi_j} - \frac{1}{\phi_i} \right],
\]
where $\Omega_i = \frac{w + \alpha_i (f + f_I)}{z}$, and $\phi_i = \frac{1 - \lambda_i p_i}{1 + (1 - \lambda_i p_i) \Omega_i}$.

Clearly, if $E\Pi^I(b_i) > 0$ and greater than the profit from ‘not bribing’, he will bribe (upon access). But there are several situations of indifference, for which we impose two tie-breaking rules:

**Assumption 1. (Tie-breaking rule I)** If ‘bribing and betting’ and ‘betting without bribing’ yield identical and positive expected profits for the influential punter, then he will choose bribing and betting.

**Tie-breaking rule II** If ‘bribing and betting’ and ‘betting without bribing’ yield zero expected profits for the influential punter, then he will not bet at all.

The first rule would bring to bear the full impact of the (negative) influence. Any adverse consequence of bribing for punter $I$, such as getting caught leading to jail and banning from sports betting etc., is captured by the penalty term $f_I$. So leaning towards betting and bribing to break the indifference should be reasonable. Tie-breaker-II is to ensure that the bribe prevention prices are well-defined.

To analyze various players’ decisions we impose the following assumption, which, along with Assumption 1, will be maintained throughout the paper. The assumption is based on sound economic principles.

**Assumption 2. (Dutch-book restriction)** The bookies must always choose prices $0 \leq \pi_1, \pi_2 \leq 1$, both on- and off-the-equilibrium path, such that $\pi_1 + \pi_2 \geq 1$.

The Dutch-book restriction (or rather the absence of the Dutch book) can be defended as follows. If instead $\pi_1 + \pi_2 < 1$, it gives rise to the “money pump” scenario implying someone

\textsuperscript{20}When $\frac{p_i}{\pi_i} = \frac{p_j}{\pi_j} \geq 1$, the punter is indifferent between two teams.

\textsuperscript{21}Betting on both teams yields the same profit as exclusive betting, given the betting rule specified above.
who otherwise might not have bet on the sporting event (for reasons of risk aversion and the likes) can make free money by spending less than a dollar to earn a dollar for sure. It is also conceivable that if one of the bookies violates the Dutch-book restriction, the other bookie can bet large sums of money and drive his competitor out of business. It is reasonable to assume that the bookies will have reserves of funds to engage in this predatory behavior.

We now consider three scenarios relevant for punter I’s bribery decisions.

**Bribe prevention:** Suppose \( \pi_i \geq p_i, i = 1, 2 \) (such that \( \max \{ \Pi_{0i}^I, \Pi_{0j}^I, 0 \} = 0 \)). Then punter I does not bribe team \( i \), if and only if \( \Pi^I(b_i) \leq 0 \), i.e.,

\[
\pi_j \geq \frac{1 - \lambda_i p_i}{1 + \lambda_i p_i} \equiv \phi_i. \quad (2)
\]

Tie-breaker-II applies when \( \Pi^I(b_i) = 0 \).

**Bet reversal:** Alternatively, suppose \( \pi_i < p_i \) (and \( \pi_j > p_j \), by Assumption 2) such that \( \max \{ \Pi_{0i}^I, \Pi_{0j}^I, 0 \} = z(\frac{p_i}{\pi_i} - 1) > 0 \). Then punter I bribes team \( i \) and bets on team \( j \) (as opposed to betting on team \( i \)), if and only if \( \Pi^I(b_i) \geq z(\frac{p_j}{\pi_i} - 1) \), i.e.,

\[
\pi_i \leq \frac{(1 - \lambda_i p_i)\pi_i}{p_i + (1 - \lambda_i p_i)\Omega_i \pi_i} \equiv \psi_i(\pi_i). \quad (3)
\]

Tie-breaker-I applies when \( \Pi^I(b_j) = z(\frac{p_j}{\pi_i} - 1) \).

**Bet accentuation:** Continuing with the assumption that \( \pi_i < p_i \) (and \( \pi_j > p_j \)) such that \( \max \{ \Pi_{0i}^I, \Pi_{0j}^I, 0 \} = z(\frac{p_i}{\pi_i} - 1) > 0 \), punter I bribes team \( j \) and bets on team \( i \) if and only if \( \Pi^I(b_j) \geq z(\frac{p_j}{\pi_i} - 1) \), i.e.,

\[
\pi_i \leq \frac{(1 - \lambda_j p_j)\pi_i}{(1 - \lambda_j p_j)\Omega_j \pi_i} \equiv h_j. \quad (4)
\]

Tie-breaker-II applies when \( \Pi^I(b_j) = z(\frac{p_j}{\pi_i} - 1) \).

**Interpretations:** Condition (2), the bribe prevention condition, says that by setting the price of ticket \( j \) high enough, team \( i \) can be protected from match-fixing, and by doing so for both tickets punter I can be altogether kept out of the market. Indeed, that will be the outcome in any equilibrium featuring bribe prevention. If punter I does not bribe but bets on team \( i \), he must earn strictly positive profit. This is possible if and only if \( \pi_i < p_i \), which is clearly loss-making for the bookies. Thus, if bribery is prevented, punter I will not participate at all.

Condition (3) is the condition for bribe inducement of team \( i \), when team \( i \) is otherwise attractive to bet on. Essentially by reducing the price of ticket \( j \) below a threshold level, the
betting incentive of punter $I$ is reversed (hence the term, *bet reversal*). The threshold level will evidently depend on the price of ticket $i$. In particular, $\psi_i < \phi_i$ for $\pi_i < p_i$; if $\pi_i = p_i$ then $\phi_i = \psi_i$.

How the threshold price for bet reversal compares with the bribe prevention price threshold can be seen in Fig. 2. Here, given $\pi_2 < p_2$ and $\pi_1 > p_1$, team 2 is bribed for $\pi_1 < \psi_2(p_2)$.

![Figure 2: Bet reversal](image)

Finally, (4) is the condition for *bribe inducement of team* $j$, when prima facie team $i$ is attractive to bet on. Here by reducing the price ticket of $i$ below a threshold level (so that bribery can be financed from the potential gains), punter $I$’s incentive to bet on team $i$ is further strengthened by prompting him to bribe team $j$ (*bet accentuation*).

An implication of the tie-breaking rule II, which is also evident in the bribery conditions (3) and (4), is that punter $I$ will bet only if his expected profit is strictly positive. This also means:

**Fact 1.** *When punter $I$ places a bet, the bookies’ expected profits from any potential trade with punter $I$ must be negative.*

4. Bertrand Competition in Bookmaking

In this section, our principal observations will be on two important issues concerning the effects of competition. First, a basic fact of (Bertrand) competition is that firms earn zero
profits. But here the profitability of trades by bookmakers depends on the type of trades. The prices may endogenously lead to match-fixing and informed trading by select punters. So whether price competition will lead to zero profits or not cannot be answered independently of the related match-fixing/corruption implications: does competition in the betting market imply a corruption-free play of the sports contest? While under certain conditions competition ensures zero profits (to the bookies) and prevention of bribery and match-fixing (Proposition 1), either of these two results may fail to obtain in isolation (Propositions 3 and 4) under complementary conditions, that is, bribery/match-fixing may be triggered with positive probability or firms may make positive expected profits. Moreover, for the scenarios that we study positive expected profits and bribery/match-fixing do not occur at the same time. In the remainder of this section, we analyze these possibilities.

Before we say what might happen in equilibrium, we can say the following.

**Lemma 1.** There cannot be an equilibrium (featuring bribe inducement or bribe prevention) in which $\pi_1 + \pi_2 < 1$, where $(\pi_1, \pi_2)$ are the minimal of two sets of prices charged by the two bookies.

It can be readily seen that if $\pi_1 + \pi_2 < 1$ were to hold in equilibrium, then it must be the case that either each ticket or at least one ticket is underpriced relative to its corrupted or uncorrupted probability of winning. Any underpriced ticket must be loss-making, and one of the bookies can always profitably deviate by raising the price. Hence, $\pi_1 + \pi_2 < 1$ cannot arise in equilibrium. This result will be useful for our analysis later on, and is not directly implied by, nor does it rely on, the Dutch-book restriction; even if the ticket prices set by each bookie individually satisfy Assumption 2, the lower price of each ticket may add up to less than 1.

**4.1 Bribe Prevention with Zero Profit**

![Figure 3: Ordinary punter’s betting rule](image)

Figure 3: Ordinary punter’s betting rule
Let us first determine the prices at which expected profit is zero and bribery is prevented. Focusing on identical prices (and therefore suppressing bookie indices), consider the posting of \((\pi_1, \pi_2)\) in the region of \(1 \leq \pi_1 + \pi_2 \leq 2\). An ordinary punter’s optimal betting rule is indicated in Fig. 3. So the bookie’s objective function can be written as:

\[
E\Pi_{BP} = \frac{y}{2} \left[ \int_{\pi_1}^{1} (1 - \frac{p_1}{\pi_1}) \, dq \right] + \frac{y}{2} \left[ \int_{0}^{1-\pi_2} (1 - \frac{p_2}{\pi_2}) \, dq \right] = y \left[ 3 - \pi_1 - \pi_2 - \frac{p_1}{\pi_1} - \frac{p_2}{\pi_2} \right].
\]

The bribe prevention constraints are: \(\pi_1 \geq \max\{p_1, \phi_2(p_1)\}, \pi_2 \geq \max\{p_2, \phi_1(p_1)\}\).

From the objective function one might expect that competition in each market should induce \(\pi_1 = p_1\) and \(\pi_2 = p_2\) (i.e., prices equal the true probabilities of winning) leading to \(E\Pi_{BP} = 0\). But to ensure such an outcome, the prices must also prevent bribery. To analyze the possibility of such an equilibrium, let us introduce two critical probabilities (refer Fig. 4):

**Definition 1.** Let \(\tilde{p}_1\) be the unique \(p_1\) such that \(\phi_2(p_1) = p_1\), and \(\hat{p}_1\) be the unique \(p_1\) such that \(\phi_1(p_1) = p_2\).

Further, \(\tilde{p}_1\) and \(\hat{p}_1\) can be calculated as follows:

\[
\tilde{p}_1 = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{(1 - \lambda_2)(1 + \Omega_2)}{\lambda_2} \right] \left[ \sqrt{1 + \frac{\lambda_2}{1 - \lambda_2} \left( \frac{4\Omega_2}{(1 + \Omega_2)^2} - 1 \right)} \right],
\]

\[
\hat{p}_1 = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{(1 - \lambda_1)(1 + \Omega_1)}{\lambda_1} \right] \left[ \sqrt{1 + \frac{\lambda_1}{1 - \lambda_1} \left( \frac{4\Omega_1}{(1 + \Omega_1)^2} - 1 \right)} \right].
\]

It can be readily checked that \(\phi'_2(p_1) > 0, \phi''_2(p_1) < 0\) with \(\phi_2(0) > 0\) and \(\phi_2(1) < 1\), as shown in Fig. 4. Therefore, a unique \(\tilde{p}_1\) must exist and is in \((0, 1)\). It then follows that at all \(p_1 < \tilde{p}_1, \phi_2(p_1) > p_1\), and at all \(p_1 > \tilde{p}_1, \phi_2(p_1) < p_1\). Similarly, \(\phi'_1(p_1) < 0, \phi''_1(p_1) < 0\) with \(\phi_1(0) > 0, \phi_1(1) < 1\). Therefore, \(\hat{p}_1\) also exists and it is unique. Further, at all \(p_1 > \hat{p}_1, \phi_1(p_1) > p_2\), and at all \(p_1 < \tilde{p}_1, \phi_1(p_1) < p_2\).

If \(\Omega_i\) is large enough, which requires \(z\) to be small relative to \(w + \alpha_i(f + f_I)\), \(\tilde{p}_1\) will be smaller than \(\hat{p}_1\). In other words, the influential punter should not be ‘too powerful’ (in terms of wealth); in Fig. 4, as \(z\) becomes large, both \(\phi_2\) and \(\phi_1\) curves shift upwards, pushing \(\tilde{p}_1\) to the right and \(\hat{p}_1\) to the left, thus shrinking and even flipping the \((\tilde{p}_1, \hat{p}_1)\) interval. Until specified otherwise, we will assume:

**Assumption 3. (Not too powerful punter I)** Let \(\Omega_1 > \frac{2(1-\lambda_1)}{2-\lambda_1}\) and \(\Omega_2 > \frac{2(1-\lambda_2)}{2-\lambda_2}\) so that \(\tilde{p}_1 < \frac{1}{2} < \hat{p}_1\).
Fig. 4: Region of bribe prevention, zero profit equilibrium

Fig. 4 is drawn on the basis of Assumption 3. Clearly, over the interval [$\tilde{p}_1, \hat{p}_1$], representing close contests, the zero-profit prices $\pi_i = p_i$ ($i = 1, 2$) prevent bribery, and these can be sustained as Bertrand equilibrium by applying the usual logic: unilateral price increase(s) by a bookie do not improve profits, and any price reduction(s) inflict losses (in addition to violating the Dutch-book constraint). The closeness of the contest means if prices are set according to fair odds, both the ticket prices tend to be rather high for the influential punter to bribe one team, bet on the other team and make a profit; hence match-fixing is prevented.

But outside [$\tilde{p}_1, \hat{p}_1$] we cannot have bribe prevention, along with zero profits, in equilibrium – a direct implication of the constructed interval [$\tilde{p}_1, \hat{p}_1$]. So now the question is, outside the interval [$\tilde{p}_1, \hat{p}_1$] can bribery be prevented with certainty while profit remains positive? The answer is ‘no’. Below we provide detailed reasons; a formal short proof appears in the Appendix.

If bribe prevention with positive profits were to be an equilibrium for sufficiently unbalanced contests, then we must have one of the following three possibilities: (i) both tickets are generating profits; (ii) only one ticket yields positive profit, while the other ticket is generating a loss, but the overall profit is positive; and (iii) only one ticket yields positive profit, while the other ticket yields zero profit. In all three cases, given Assumption 3 and also as is evident from Fig. 4, only one team, i.e. the weak team, needs to be protected from the influential punter’s betting by raising its price well above its uncorrupted probability of win, and thus yielding positive profits for the bookmakers. For instance in the region $[0, \tilde{p}_1)$, ticket 1 needs to be protected. For the other ticket (namely ticket 2 when $p_1 < \tilde{p}_1$), competition will wither away profits. Therefore, possibility (i) is ruled out. Possibility (ii) is also ruled out, because one can raise the price of the loss-making ticket and lose the market.
altogether.

So, we are left with only possibility (iii). For the sake of concreteness consider \( p_1 < \hat{p}_1 \). Here as argued above, the profit-generating ticket must be ticket 1, due to the bribe prevention constraint \( \pi_1 \geq \phi_2 \) (recall (2)). But it can be easily seen that competition will force the constraint to bind. Thus, we will have \( \pi_1 = \phi_2 > p_1 \). For ticket 2 we have \( \pi_2 = p_2 \).

Now, from this proposed equilibrium, we argue that both tickets can be undercut without increasing the prospect of bribery and profit will improve. To see that, suppose one of the bookies reduces \( \pi_2 \) slightly below \( p_2 \) and takes a small loss on ticket 2. But simultaneously he makes the bribe prevention constraint \( \pi_1 = \phi_2 \) irrelevant. As punter \( I \) now can gainfully bet on ticket 2 without committing bribery, the new bribe prevention constraint should be \( \pi_1 > \psi_2 \) (recall (3) and tie-breaking rule I). As can be checked from (2) and (3), \( \psi_2 < \phi_2 \) as long as \( \pi_2 < p_2 \). Therefore \( \pi_1 \) can be suitably reduced to \( \pi_1' \) (in accordance with the reduction in \( \pi_2 \) below \( p_2 \)) such that \( \psi_2 < \pi_1' < \phi_2 \). Thus, bribery is still prevented and the bookie fully captures both markets. As long as price reductions are of small order, loss in ticket 2 will be approximately zero, and gains from ticket 1 will be bounded away from zero, because the new profit from ticket 1 is almost twice as large. Hence, possibility (iii) is also ruled out.

**Proposition 1.** *(Bribe prevention)* Suppose Assumption 3 holds.

(i) For \( p_1 \in [\tilde{p}_1, \hat{p}_1] \), the unique and symmetric equilibrium under Bertrand competition is \( \pi_1 = p_1 \) and \( \pi_2 = p_2 \), such that bribery is prevented surely and each bookie earns zero expected profit.

(ii) For \( p_1 \) outside the interval \([\tilde{p}_1, \hat{p}_1]\), there is no pure strategy equilibrium under Bertrand competition in which bribery is prevented with probability one.

Thus, it is possible that the influential punter will not bribe so that match-fixing is not a threat and Bertrand competition leads to zero profits with prices of bets equalling fair odds. In contrast, in Shin (1992; Proposition 1) the presence of an insider meant distortion in the prices of bets away from fair odds, in particular, prices reflected the favorite-longshot bias. The main reason for the difference in our result is that, different from Shin (1992) and similar other analysis of competitive bookmaking (e.g., Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2005), our bookmakers are as well informed as the influential punter (i.e., the insider) when match-fixing is deterred. The basis for price distortion is thus removed.

**4.2 Bribe Inducement with Zero Profit**

Outside \([\tilde{p}_1, \hat{p}_1]\), we will look for a (pure strategy pricing) equilibrium in which bribery occurs with positive probability. Also, we will be interested in the qualitative equilibrium
properties characterizing bribery. Studying when bribery actually occurs, and not just talk about the implications of its potential threat, should be highly relevant in the context of growing incidence of betting related match-fixing in sports as we have cited in the Introduction.

Let us start by asking: Which team will be bribed? The following result will be useful in analyzing the bribery prospect of the longshot.

**Lemma 2.** Suppose Assumption 3 holds (i.e., the influential punter is not too powerful). Then at all \( p_1 \leq \tilde{p}_1 \) it must be that \( h_1 < p_1 \), where \( h_1 \equiv \frac{(1-\lambda_1)p_1}{(1-\lambda_1p_1)\Omega_1} \) as in (4).

If the longshot (i.e. team 1 when \( p_1 < \tilde{p}_1 \) is to be bribed, ticket 2 price, \( \pi_2 \), must be lowered below \( h_1 \) by the bet accentuation condition (4). By Lemma 2 \( h_1 < p_1 \) and therefore \( h_1 < p_2 \). This suggests that a large rent has to be transferred to punter I to induce him to bribe the longshot. This may not be optimal.

**Proposition 2. (Bribery of the strong team)** Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Then in any equilibrium (of the Bertrand game) there is either bribery of only the strong team or none at all.

To understand why only the strong team is bribed, consider first bribery of the longshot (bet accentuation). If team 1 (the longshot) were to be bribed, ideally the bookies would have liked to lure the naive punters to bet on team 1 by setting \( \pi_1 \) appropriately low and/or \( \pi_2 \) high. But to encourage punter I to bribe team 1 and bet on team 2, the bookies must do the opposite – set \( \pi_2 \) low and \( \pi_1 \) high. This conflict makes bribery of the underdog loss-making and unsustainable for the bookies. Next, consider the prospect of either team being bribed. That would require setting not just \( \pi_2 \) low, but also \( \pi_1 \) low. There are no pair of prices feasible for this to happen, as the Dutch-book restriction will be violated. Thus, if bribery is to occur, it must involve only the favorite.

Studying data on German horse race betting, Winter and Kukuk (2008) found some evidence of cheating by the favorites when races are very uneven. Suspecting cheating by one of the favorite jockeys, the bettors tend to bet disproportionately more on the longshots. Winter and Kukuk’s empirical observation that the favorite(s) cheat bears some resemblance to our theoretical observation above. However, their analysis is mainly for parimutuel betting whereas ours is for fixed-odds betting. In parimutuel betting, market odds are generated endogenously based on actual bets placed (rather than bookie-determined odds). Therefore, which team is bribed should depend on the distribution of naive punters’ beliefs about the teams’ chances, their beliefs about others’ beliefs and their betting strategies, etc. Intuitively, if a majority of naive punters is expected to take a bet on a particular team, be it favorite or not, then an influential punter would be tempted to bribe this team, bet on the other team
and profit from the endogenously determined low odds on the eventually winning team. That is, bribing decision in parimutuel betting should depend on the general direction of bettor strategies in the market due to externalities generated through endogenous odds, which is quite distinct from the considerations relevant for fixed-odds markets. To the best of our knowledge there is no formal theoretical analysis of match-fixing for parimutuel betting, so a clear differentiation between the two market forms must await further research.

To continue with our analysis, when the favorite (team 2) is to be bribed, $\pi_2$ must be above some threshold level ($h_1$) and $\pi_1$ must be below a similar threshold level ($\psi_2$). Can the bookies then make positive expected profits, and can such profit-generating prices be sustained as a Nash equilibrium? The answer is ‘no’. Even though the Dutch-book restriction limits the scale of undercutting, it turns out that there will always be some incentive for slight undercutting on one or both tickets. If ticket 1 were to generate positive profit alone or along with ticket 2 (remember, team 1’s winning prospect is enhanced with the bribery of team 2), then a bookie can easily steal this market without altering punter $I$’s incentive to bribe team 2 (simply lower $\pi_1$ slightly). On the other hand, if only ticket 2 generates profit then a coordinated undercutting on both tickets (if necessary) becomes profitable, despite a loss on ticket 1 (a formal argument appears in the proof). In either scenario, positive profit cannot be sustained.

It is also the case that in a bribe inducement equilibrium, the favorite must be under-priced ($\pi_2 < p_2$) and the longshot then must be over-priced ($\pi_1 > p_1$) relative to the uncorrupted probabilities of winning. The reason is, the bookies need to attract (ordinary) punters to bet on a losing cause, i.e. the favorite, and at the same time discourage them from betting on the longshot whose probability of winning has secretly gone up. These also imply that punter $I$ must be earning a strictly positive expected profit in a bribe inducement equilibrium, regardless of whether the bookies make zero or positive expected profits.

Given Proposition 2 and the first observation above, we are left with only the possibility of a zero profit, bribe inducement equilibrium. Below we first define this equilibrium, followed by formal statements of the above observations in lemmas (as we will need part of the equilibrium definition to prove the lemmas), and then we develop the equilibrium argument.

**Equilibrium $E$.** Suppose Assumption 3 holds and $p_1 \in [0, \hat{p}_1)$. Symmetric\(^{22}\) equilibrium prices $(\pi_{10}, \pi_{20})$ with $\pi_{20} < p_2$ and $\pi_{10} > p_1$ are such that on access only team 2 (the strong

\(^{22}\)By symmetry we mean symmetry across bookies. We do not analyze whether there might be an asymmetric equilibrium in which bribery is induced (with positive probability), at least one bookie is the sole server in one market and each bookie makes zero expected profit. Such an equilibrium, if it exists, will be similar in spirit, as far as bribery is concerned, to the equilibrium $E$. Further, symmetric prices must generate zero profit in each market, otherwise deviation would occur.
team) will be bribed, whereupon punter I will bet on team 1 (the weak team) and otherwise (i.e., team 2 is not accessed) he will bet on team 2. Each bookie makes zero expected profit in each market, that is,

\[
E \Pi_1^b = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ (1 - \pi_{10}) \left[ 1 - \frac{p_1^b}{\pi_{10}} \right] y + \mu_2 z \left[ 1 - \frac{(1 - \lambda_2 p_2)}{\pi_{10}} \right] \right\} = 0, \tag{5}
\]

\[
E \Pi_2^b = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ (1 - \pi_{20}) \left[ 1 - \frac{p_2^b}{\pi_{20}} \right] y + (1 - \mu_2) z \left[ 1 - \frac{p_2}{\pi_{20}} \right] \right\} = 0, \tag{6}
\]

where \( p_1^b = [\mu_2(1 - \lambda_2 p_2) + (1 - \mu_2)p_1] \) and \( p_2^b = 1 - p_1^b = [\mu_2 \lambda_2 p_2 + (1 - \mu_2)p_2] \) are the ex-ante probabilities of team 1 and team 2 winning.

**Lemma 3.** Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Then there is no equilibrium with match-fixing in which the bookies earn positive (expected) profits.

**Lemma 4.** Suppose Assumption 3 holds, and \( p_1 \in [0, \bar{p}_1) \). Then there cannot be a bribe inducement equilibrium such that \( \pi_2 \geq p_2 \) and \( \pi_1 \leq p_1 \). In other words, any bribe inducement equilibrium must involve \( \pi_2 < p_2 \) and \( \pi_1 > p_1 \), with punter I earning a positive (expected) profit.

**Equilibrium \( \mathcal{E} \) construction.** The two prices defined by (5) and (6) must satisfy condition (3) for bribery of team 2:

\[
\pi_{10} \leq \psi_2(\pi_{20}),
\]

and violate condition (4) so that team 1 is not bribed:

\[
\pi_{20} > h_1.
\]

From (5) and (6) we can identify the bounds for \( \pi_{10} \) and \( \pi_{20} \). In the event of gaining access to team 2, punter I will bribe team 2 and bet on team 1 if the price of ticket 1 is smaller than the corrupted probability of team 1 winning, i.e. \( \pi_{10} < (1 - \lambda_2 p_2) \). So the second term in (5), which refers to profit from punter I, must be negative, and therefore, the first term in (5) (i.e. profit from the naive punters) must be positive, which implies \( \pi_{10} > p_1^b \).

Therefore, \( \pi_{10} \) must lie within the interval\(^{23} \left( p_1^b, (1 - \lambda_2 p_2) \right) \). Similarly, in the event of not gaining access to team 2, punter I will bet on team 2 if \( \pi_{20} < p_2 \). This makes the second term (representing profit from punter I) in (6) negative, and therefore the first term in (6), which represents profit from the naive punters, must be positive implying \( \pi_{20} > p_2^b \).

\(^{23}\)It is evident that \( p_1 < p_1^b < 1 - \lambda_2 p_2 \).
to say, $\pi_{20}$ must belong to the interval $\left(p_b^b, p^2\right)$. The constructed ranges for $\pi_{10}$ and $\pi_{20}$ are in conformity with the Lemma 4 observation.

The above bounds ensure that $\pi_{10} + \pi_{20} > p_1^b + p_2^b = 1$. Further, since $E\Pi_1^b$ and $E\Pi_2^b$ are continuous functions of $\pi_1$ and $\pi_2$ respectively, there must exist at least one $\pi_{10}$ and one $\pi_{20}$ within the above specified intervals solving (5) and (6). In fact, the solution $(\pi_{10}, \pi_{20})$ is unique.$^{24}$

Before we start to analyze various deviation incentives, we impose a mild assumption on $(\mu_1, \mu_2)$ and $(\lambda_1, \lambda_2)$.

**Assumption 4. (A threshold on strong team’s ex-ante winning odds, with corruption)** For all $p_1 \leq \bar{p}_1 < 1/2$, the following holds:

$$p_2[\mu_2\lambda_2 + (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2)] + \mu_1(1 - \lambda_1 p_1) > p_1,$$

or equivalently

$$p_1[(1 - \mu_1) + \mu_1 \lambda_1] < p_2[(1 - \mu_2) + \mu_2 \lambda_2].$$

That is, despite the prospect of match-fixing the strong team does not become weaker than where the weak team was in the absence of corruption.$^{25}$ Under symmetry of $\mu$ and $\lambda$, the assumption is automatically satisfied.

Unlike the textbook Bertrand model, analyzing deviations is much more complex in our setting due to the interdependence between the two markets: gains from undercutting in one market must be evaluated in light of the possible bribery implication in the other market, and moreover a bookie will have the option of altering the two prices in various combinations (lower/increase, lower/stay-put, lower/lower, etc.). In addition, if a deviation alters the status-quo bribery or no-bribery situation, the deviation profit of the bookie can rise or fall discontinuously.

Starting at zero-profit prices $(\pi_{10}, \pi_{20})$, neither bookie would gain by deviating unless it alters the bribery incentive of punter $I$. We must therefore protect our posited equilibrium against (only) the following three deviations altering the bribery incentive:

$^{24}$Eqs. (5) and (6) are quadratic in $\pi_{10}$ and $\pi_{20}$ respectively, solving which we obtain:

$$\pi_{10} = \frac{1}{2y} \left\{ (y + k_1) \pm \sqrt{(y - k_1)^2 + 4y\mu_2\lambda_2p_2^2z} \right\},$$

$$\pi_{20} = \frac{1}{2y} \left\{ (y + k_2) \pm \sqrt{(y - k_2)^2 + 4y(1 - \mu_2)p_1^2z} \right\},$$

where $k_1 = p_1^b y + \mu_2 z$ and $k_2 = p_2^b y + (1 - \mu_2) z$. For each price, one of the two roots exceeds 1.

$^{25}$Note, however, that with bribery possible, the ex-ante probability of team 2 winning may well be lower than that of team 1 because $\mu_2$ may be high, $\mu_1$ low while $\lambda_2$ could be low and $\lambda_1$ high.
Starting from $h_1 < \pi_{20} < p_2$ so that team 1 is not bribed, and $p_1 < \pi_{10} \leq \psi_2(\pi_{20})$ so that team 2 is bribed,

(i) Deviation leading to bribery of team 1 instead of team 2: $\pi_2$ is reduced to $\pi'_2$ and $\pi_1$ is chosen to be some appropriate $\pi'_1$ such that $\pi'_2 \leq h_1$ and $\min\{\pi'_1, \pi_{10}\} > \psi_2(\pi'_{2})$; \footnote{Note that as $\pi_2$ is lowered to $\pi'_2,$ $\psi_2(\pi'_2) < \psi_2(\pi_{20})$; it is conceivable that $\psi_2(\pi'_2) < \pi_{10} < \psi_2(\pi_{20})$ in which case the deviating bookie may even set $\pi'_1 \geq \pi_{10}$. Setting $\pi'_1$ in excess of $\pi_{10}$ would imply though losing the sale of ticket 1, which is likely to be an unwise move.}

(ii) Deviation leading to bribery of either team: $\pi_2$ is reduced to $\pi'_2$ and $\pi_1$ is appropriately chosen to be some $\pi'_1$ such that $\pi'_2 \leq h_1$ and $p_1 < \min\{\pi'_1, \pi_{10}\} \leq \psi_2(\pi'_2)$;

(iii) Deviation leading to bribery of neither team: $\pi_2$ is reduced to $\pi'_2$ and $\pi_1$ is reduced to $\pi'_1$ (or unchanged so that $\pi'_1 = \pi_{10}$) such that $h_1 < \pi'_2$ and $p_1 < \psi_2(\pi'_2) < \pi'_1$. \footnote{To deviate and set $\pi'_1 > \pi_{10}$ will always be dominated by $\pi'_1 = \pi_{10}$ for the no-bribery deviation considered.}

It turns out that deviations (i) and (ii) are either infeasible (i.e. violate the Dutch-book restriction) or clearly unprofitable (Assumption 4 and Lemma 2 will be used to establish this in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix). It is deviation (iii) that requires additional attention. It is quite possible that if $\pi_{10}$ is sufficiently high, then one of the bookies can undercut in such a manner that punter $I$ will no longer find it optimal to bribe, and yet the deviating bookie will make a positive expected profit. We therefore identify an upper bound for $\pi_{10}$, below which deviation (iii) will not be profitable. The following two definitions will be used to determine the relevant upper bound.

**Definition 2. (A bound for $\pi_{10}$)** Fix any $0 < p_1 < \bar{p}_1$. Let $(\bar{\pi}_1, \bar{\pi}_2)$ be such that $\bar{\pi}_1 + \bar{\pi}_2 = 1$ and $\bar{\pi}_1 = \psi_2(\bar{\pi}_2)$.

By construction the prices $(\bar{\pi}_1, \bar{\pi}_2)$ are unique, and $\bar{\pi}_1 > p_1$, $\bar{\pi}_2 < p_2$.

**Definition 3. (An alternative bound for $\pi_{10}$)** Fix any $0 < p_1 < \bar{p}_1$, and assume that $\bar{\pi}_1 \geq \frac{\phi_2}{1+\phi_2}$. There exists a unique pair of prices, $(\pi_1, \pi_2) = (\pi^{M0}_1, \pi^{M0}_2)$, at which the dual objectives of $E\Pi^M = 0$ and $\pi_1 = \psi_2(\pi_2)$ will be met, where $E\Pi^M$ represents no-bribery, monopoly profit with punter $I$ betting on team 2 and given by

$$E\Pi^M = y\left[3 - \pi_1 - \pi_2 - \frac{p_1}{\pi_1} - \frac{p_2}{\pi_2}\right] + z\left[1 - \frac{p_2}{\pi_2}\right],$$

where $p_1 < \pi^{M0}_1 < \phi_2$ and $0 < \pi^{M0}_2 < p_2$. \footnote{Fix any $0 < p_1 < \bar{p}_1$ and $\pi_1 > \pi_1$ so that team 1 is not bribed, and $p_1 < \pi_{10} \leq \psi_2(\pi_{20})$ so that team 2 is bribed.}
In Fig. 5a displayed, the relevant upper bound on $\pi_{10}$ will be $\tilde{\pi}_1$ (see Definition 2). Uniqueness of $(\tilde{\pi}_1, \tilde{\pi}_2)$ is evident from the construction. Next in Fig. 5b, the relevant upper bound on $\pi_{10}$ is $\pi_{10}^{M0}$ (see Definition 3). Recall, by engaging in deviation (iii) a bookie expects to receive the monopoly profit, $E{\Pi}^{M}$, with bribery eliminated. It can be checked that the iso-profit curve, $E{\Pi}^{M} = 0$, intersects the $\pi_1 + \pi_2 = 1$ line at two points ($\pi_1 = p_1, \pi_2 = p_2$) and $(\pi_1 = \frac{y}{1+y}, \pi_2 = \frac{1}{1+y})$. Depending on the parameter values we will have $p_1 < \tilde{\pi}_1 < \frac{y}{1+y}$ (as drawn in Fig. 5a), or $p_1 < \frac{\nu}{1+y} < \tilde{\pi}_1$ (as drawn in Fig. 5b). Since $E{\Pi}^{M}$ is defined over the region $\pi_1 + \pi_2 \geq 1$, we discard the segment of the iso-profit curve that falls below the $\pi_1 + \pi_2 = 1$ line. It can also be verified that the iso-profit curve will be concave at $\pi_1 \geq \frac{y}{1+y}$ (assuming $p_1 < \frac{\nu}{1+y}$). Further, any price pair that lies outside (or to the left of) the curve representing $E{\Pi}^{M} = 0$ will yield negative profits (under monopoly and no-bribery), and any price pair lying inside (or to the right) will yield positive profits under monopoly and no-bribery.

28 When $\tilde{\pi}_1 < \frac{y}{1+y}$, $\pi_{10}^{M0}$ does not exist, as in Fig. 5a. Point $w$ represents a (zero profit) bribe inducement equilibrium, where $\pi_{10} < \tilde{\pi}_1$. To the south-west of point $w$ there is no price pair at which the incentive for bribing the favorite team (team 2) is violated and at the same time the Dutch-book restriction is met. Put another way, by moving south-west there is no way one can cross over to the other side of the $\psi_2$ curve and still be on the right-hand side of the $\pi_1 + \pi_2 = 1$ line. But if the equilibrium was at point $w'$ instead of $w$, in which case $\pi_{10} > \tilde{\pi}_1$, then a deviation to a point like $d$ would have been possible. Point $d$ satisfies the Dutch-book restriction and it also yields a positive profit, no-bribery monopoly outcome. Thus, when $\tilde{\pi}_1 < \frac{y}{1+y}$, the restriction $\pi_{10} \leq \tilde{\pi}_1$ is both necessary and sufficient to rule out deviation (iii). The set of sustainable bribe inducement equilibrium prices is given by the shaded area (not including $\pi_1 = p_1^b, \pi_2 = p_2^b$).

The possibility of $\tilde{\pi}_1 \geq \frac{y}{1+y}$ is drawn in Fig. 5b. The equilibrium price is again denoted by point $w$, which shows that $\pi_{10} < \pi_{10}^{M0}$. Starting from point $w$ if one moves south-west (i.e. undercutting on both tickets), one cannot violate the incentive for bribing the favorite team (by crossing over the $\psi_2$ curve) without crossing over the $E{\Pi}^{M} = 0$ curve. That is to say, deviation to no-bribery prices will only fetch negative profits. Similarly, if $\pi_{10}$ was greater than $\pi_{10}^{M0}$, as is the case with point $w'$, then deviation to point $d$, where bribery does not occur, is perfectly possible and it will be profitable as well. As before, $\pi_{10} \leq \pi_{10}^{M0}$ is thus the necessary and sufficient condition for ruling out deviation (iii). The set of sustainable

28 For ease of exposition we ignored the bribery indifference condition while drawing the iso-profit curve. But the underlying probability of a team winning that determines the no-bribery monopoly profit will depend on whether the prices remain above the bribery indifference curve $\psi_2$. We consider this aspect in our formal argument.
Figure 5a: Zero profit, bribe inducement equilibrium

Figure 5b: Zero profit, bribe inducement equilibrium
equilibrium prices is given by the shaded area (not including $\pi_1 = p_1^b, \pi_2 = p_2^b$). As a numerical illustration of the equilibrium for this case as well as the first case, we provide an example in the Appendix (see Example 1).

**Proposition 3. (Match-fixing Equilibrium)** Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold and consider any $p_1 < \tilde{p}_1$. Then $(\pi_{10} > p_1, \pi_{20} < p_2)$ satisfying (5) and (6), and thus meeting the Dutch-book restriction, constitute a unique competitive equilibrium denoted by $E$ if and only if

$$
\pi_{10} \leq \psi_2(\pi_{20}), \quad \pi_{20} > h_1, \quad \text{and} \quad \begin{cases} 
\pi_{10} \leq \tilde{\pi}_1 & \text{if } \tilde{\pi}_1 < \frac{y_1}{1+y}, \\
\pi_{10} \leq \pi_{1M0} & \text{if } \tilde{\pi}_1 \geq \frac{y_1}{1+y}.
\end{cases}
$$

In equilibrium,

(i) punter I will bribe the strong team, team 2, whenever he gets an access to team 2;

(ii) each bookie will earn zero expected profit; and

(iii) punter I will earn strictly positive expected profit.

Thus, under plausible economic situations price competition among bookmakers in the sports betting market may endogenously lead to match-fixing initiated by a corrupt punter. And in conformity with common perceptions, with contests uneven the strong team is bribed. Finally, with the possibility of profitable match-fixing open, the influential punter can also profitably bet even when he actually fails to get an access to the strong team and thus fails to bribe. That is, ticket prices are such that the influential punter profits either way. This is in contrast with the bribe prevention equilibrium of Proposition 1 in which the influential punter is fully kept out.

One may be tempted to conclude that the above result is an evidence against the conventional wisdom that more competition means less corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). But there is little to relate our model to this usual corruption/competition story where incentives for bribe-giving may be created because of an exclusive valuable asset (say a monopoly service provision right), access to which can be restricted by regulation and where some key government official decides arbitrarily, without transparency, who should get access.

**4.3 Positive Profit, Bribe Prevention Equilibrium**

In this section we show that if Assumption 3 is violated and if in particular $\hat{p}_1 < \frac{1}{2} < \tilde{p}_1$, there are some interesting implications, especially for contests that are “close”. Violation of Assumption 3 occurs if $\Omega_i$ is relatively small, i.e., $z$ is large relative to $(w + \alpha_i(f + f_i))$ so
that the influential punter is quite powerful in terms of wealth. Fig. 6 presents this case.\textsuperscript{29}

Figure 6: Positive profit, bribe prevention prices

Here we identify the possibility of two types of equilibrium. In one, either team will be bribed by punter $I$ upon access but the bookies earn zero expected profit. In the other, bribery is prevented with certainty and the bookies earn positive expected profit each. The first possibility is similar to our bribe inducement equilibrium in highly uneven contests (Proposition 3) except that now even the weak team is bribed and then punter $I$ will bet on the strong team; in the event of not getting access to any team he will bet on neither. Punter $I$ will also earn a strictly positive (ex-ante) expected profit. This equilibrium can be sustained if the bookies, unilaterally, cannot profitably undercut in one or both prices to eliminate punter $I$'s bribery incentive for \textit{at least} one team. The proof of this claim is similar to the proof of Proposition 3, so we include the formal result and its proof in an on-line supplementary material file. Instead, our focus here is going to be on the other equilibrium involving positive profit and bribe prevention that contrasts with the finding of Proposition 1 (under the opposite assumption of ‘not too powerful’ influential punter, i.e., Assumption 3).\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{29}Bribe prevention then requires ticket prices to be set high, with $\phi_1, \phi_2$ shifting upwards; contrast Fig. 6 with Fig. 4, especially the reversal of positions of $\tilde{p}_1$ and $\hat{p}_1$.

\textsuperscript{30}It is difficult to ascertain in the general case whether these two equilibria will hold in isolation or simultaneously. In our on-line supplementary file we provide an example of multiple equilibria – a high-price, bribe prevention equilibrium and a low-price, bribe inducement equilibrium – either of which may
Our proposed bribe prevention equilibrium is \((\pi_1 = \phi_2, \pi_2 = \phi_1)\); this generates strictly positive profit since \(\phi_2 > p_1, \phi_1 > p_2\). More precisely, each bookie’s equilibrium profit is:

\[
E\Pi_{BP} = \frac{y}{2} [3 - \phi_2 - \phi_1 - \frac{p_1}{\phi_2} - \frac{p_2}{\phi_1}] \equiv k.
\]

\(k\) can be large around \(p_1 = 1/2\).\(^{31}\) We need to show that this equilibrium is immune to all possible undercutting, i.e., undercutting on both tickets and undercutting on each ticket separately. In what follows we provide an informal argument by suggesting conditions that will ensure immunity against all types of undercutting. The formal proof and the precise conditions are provided in the Appendix.

**Slight undercutting on both tickets:** First consider undercutting on both tickets. In Fig. 6, let us select \(p_1\) to be \(m\), at which \(\phi_2 = b\) and \(\phi_1 = a\). Suppose one bookie deviates from the equilibrium by undercutting \(\pi_2\) slightly below \(a\), and \(\pi_1\) slightly below \(b\). As long as the reduced \(\pi_i\) is strictly greater than \(p_i\), by the violation of bribe prevention constraint (2) punter 1 will be strictly better off by bribing. Therefore, team 1 will be bribed with probability \(\mu_1\) and team 2 with probability \(\mu_2\). Having monopolized both markets the undercutting bookie will face significant losses to punter 1 with probability \(\mu_1 + \mu_2\), against significant gains from ordinary punters with probability \((1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2)\). Intuitively, it then seems that his expected overall profit is likely to be smaller than the non-deviation duopoly profit if \(\mu_1 + \mu_2\) is sufficiently high. Let \(\bar{\mu}\) be such that the deviation profit \(E\Pi_{BI}\) is just equal to the duopoly profit \(k\), and for \(\mu_1 + \mu_2 > \bar{\mu}\), \(E\Pi_{BI} < k\). Thus, a lower bound on the total probability of access seems in order. In the Appendix we formalize this logic.

---

\(^{31}\) Note that even if the volume of bets on the two tickets may be fairly even if the ticket prices, for \(p_1 = 1/2\), are symmetric (or fairly close), large prices of bets means the bookies’ profits may be substantial.
Slight undercutting on a single ticket: Suppose the deviating bookie lowers \( \pi_1 \) slightly from \( b \) while maintaining \( \pi_2 = \phi_1 = a \). As long as \( \pi_1 > p_1 \) (which is indeed possible at \( p_1 = m \) in Fig. 6), any slight reduction in \( \pi_1 \) from \( \phi_2 \) will trigger bribery of team 2 with probability \( \mu_2 \) (but team 1 will not be bribed). In the event of bribery capturing market 1 becomes a curse, and therefore if \( \mu_2 \) is sufficiently high the bookie will be deterred from such undercutting. Let the critical value of \( \mu_2 \) be denoted as \( \mu_2^* \), such that at all \( \mu_2 \geq \mu_2^* \), \( \mathbb{E}\Pi_{BI} \leq k \). Symmetrically, let \( \mu_1^* \) be the critical value of \( \mu_1 \) such that at all \( \mu_1 \geq \mu_1^* \) slight undercutting on ticket 2 is deterred.

Thus, we need to have lower bounds on individual \( \mu_i \)s as well as their sum (\( \mu_1 + \mu_2 \)) to support the proposed equilibrium.

Large-scale undercutting: In addition to slight undercutting, we need to consider large-scale undercutting as well. In Fig. 6 \( \pi_1 \) can be reduced from \( b \) to some \( \pi_1' \) and \( \pi_2 \) can be reduced from \( a \) to some \( \pi_2' \) such that \( \pi_1' + \pi_2' \geq 1 \). For example, \( \pi_1' = n \) and \( \pi_2' = e \) can be one such deviation, \( \pi_1' = e \) and \( \pi_2' = d \) is another deviation.\(^{32}\) With such deviation the deviating bookie will earn monopoly profit (from both markets) with the prospect of match-fixing for either team. Identifying conditions under which this deviation (monopoly) profit falls short of the duopoly profit \( k \) proves to be difficult under the general case. But we can say that if the monopoly profit from deviation (admitting bribery of either team) is increasing at \( \pi_1 = \phi_2 \) and \( \pi_2 = \phi_1 \), then the deviating bookie would prefer to undercut slightly rather than substantially. The same argument applies when we consider undercutting on a single ticket (admitting bribery of only one team).

Based on the monotonicity argument of the deviation profit (as above), we can restrict attention to small-scale undercutting. In the following proposition we provide a sufficient condition to this effect. Then supporting of the bribe prevention, positive profit equilibrium requires ruling out slight undercutting – on one or both tickets – which will be ensured by the lower bound restrictions on \( \mu_1 \) and \( \mu_2 \) discussed earlier. In Example 2 in the Appendix we demonstrate this type of equilibrium numerically.

Proposition 4. (Bribe prevention and positive profit) Suppose \( \hat{p}_1 < \frac{1}{2} < \tilde{p}_1 \), and \( p_1 \in (\hat{p}_1, \tilde{p}_1) \). That is, the influential punter has significant wealth and the contests are “close”. If

(i) \( \mu_1 \) and \( \mu_2 \) exceed some threshold levels (to be precisely determined in the Appendix), and

\(^{32}\)At \( \pi_2' = d < p_2 \) and \( \pi_1' = e > p_1 \), the Dutch-book restriction is satisfied. To see this we can map \( \pi_1 = e \) onto the horizontal axis and arrive at point \( g \) which is above the 45° line and has coordinates \( (e, d) \). Since point \( g \) is outside the unit simplex, \( e + d \) must be greater than 1.
(ii) \[ \sqrt{\frac{\rho + z \mu_2 (1 - \lambda_2 p_2)}{y}} \geq \phi_2, \quad \text{and} \quad \sqrt{(1 - \rho) + \frac{z \mu_1 (1 - \lambda_1 p_1)}{y}} \geq \phi_1, \] where \( \rho = \mu_1 \lambda_1 p_1 + \mu_2 (1 - \lambda_2 p_2) + (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) p_1 \) is the ex-ante probability of team 1 winning when either team can be bribed,

then \( \pi_1 = \phi_2 \) and \( \pi_2 = \phi_1 \) is a bribe prevention equilibrium in which each bookie makes a positive expected profit.

The above is a possibility result which, to our knowledge, is new. One would normally expect competition to drive down symmetrically informed bookmakers’ profits to zero (as was the result in Shin’s (1992) exogenous insider information model, for instance). Our intuition is that high chances of corruption make undercutting a risky proposition as it may create a ‘lemon’ (Akerlof, 1970) and give rise to an adverse selection problem similar to the credit rationing story of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Potential entry by the influential punter who has significant wealth and who can fix the match works as a disciplining influence deterring deviation by the bookies from the implicit ‘collusive’ equilibrium. Bookmakers’ tendencies to resist excessive price reduction is similar to banks resisting lowering of interest rates that may invite high-risk borrowers.

It may also be noted that positive profits for the bookies are generated not due to any asymmetry of information between the bookies about the teams’ winning odds, although such a situation can be easily visualized when sometimes bookies may have differing private information due to their expertise (or the lack of it) on underworld/illegal betting syndicates. Our result thus differs from that of Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999) who studied Bertrand competition between two incumbent banks (who are somewhat better but asymmetrically informed about the potential customers’ riskiness due their differing existing market shares) and an entrant (with no information) and showed that the dominant incumbent bank would earn positive profits due to its superior information.

We can now assess the reasons for possible multiple equilibria. In the not-so-powerful influential punter case, for close contests, competition had driven prices all the way down to zero-profit levels and all along bribery of both teams were prevented. Then, having reached the zero-profit prices, further unilateral price reduction(s) that could potentially lead to bribe inducement are not feasible as that would violate the Dutch-book restriction. In contrast, in the powerful influential punter case (and close contests), the bookies could be restrained from competitive price cutting (as deviation profit would be lower, even when strictly positive) well before individual prices reach the uncorrupted win probabilities due to the adverse selection problem noted above; the significance of the influential punter’s wealth...
is of relevance here. But it is also conceivable that if the bookies “start” from symmetric
prices at which bribery is already induced and profits are positive, the competitive pressure
will lead prices all the way down to zero-profit levels as there is no further fear of inducing
bribery.

So far we have not commented on the favorite-longshot bias. In the bribe prevention
equilibrium of Proposition 1, the bias clearly disappears. But in Propositions 3 and 4, the
favorite-longshot bias reappears.

4.4 Uneven Contest and the Possibility of Bribing the Favorite

Now we consider uneven contests continuing with the assumption that \( \hat{p}_1 < \frac{1}{2} < \tilde{p}_1 \). In
particular, we restrict attention to \( p_1 < \hat{p}_1 \) (i.e., highly uneven contests). What can we say
about match-fixing or bribe prevention? We discuss the following possibilities informally.

Bribe prevention: As argued in section 4.1, here too bribe prevention with zero profit is
not possible, because at all \( p_1 < \hat{p}_1 \), we have \( p_1 < \phi_2 \) and \( \phi_1 < p_2 \). Prevention of bribery of
team 2 requires setting \( \pi_1 \geq \phi_2 \) if \( \pi_2 = p_2 \). But then ticket 1 will yield positive profit.

Similarly, bribe prevention with positive profit is also not possible. If the prices are set
such that \( \pi_2 = p_2 \) and \( \pi_1 = \phi_2 > p_1 \) (yielding positive profit on ticket 1), one of the bookies
can slightly undercut on ticket 2 (from \( \pi_2 \) to \( \pi'_2 \)) and simultaneously undercut on ticket 1 in
such a manner that \( \pi'_1 > \psi_2(\pi'_2) \). This undercutting is clearly profitable and yet bribery is
avoided, as shown earlier in section 4.1. Thus, here too bribe prevention with positive profit
is ruled out.

Bribe inducement: We can confirm that Lemma 4 will continue to hold, so any bribe
inducement equilibrium must involve \( \pi_2 < p_2 \) and \( \pi_1 > p_1 \). But then we can rule out
equilibrium involving bribery of the underdog; bribery of the underdog (team 1) would
imply punter I betting on the favorite (team 2), and since \( \pi_2 < p_2 \), this would imply, as
shown in the proof of Proposition 2, ticket 2 will be loss-making. Also it can be checked that
this observation does not rely on Assumption 3.

How about equilibrium involving bribery of either team or only the favorite? Note that
when punter I is quite powerful (i.e., \( z \) is large relative to \( w + \alpha(f + f_I) \)), \( \Omega_I \) falls below 1
and our Lemma 2 may not necessarily hold; \( h_1 \) can be larger than \( p_1 \) or even larger than
\( p_2 \). In section 4.3, a low value of \( h_1 \) was particularly helpful in eliminating the incentive to
bribe the underdog (i.e., bribery of the bet accentuation variety), which in turn helped us to
rule out the possibility of bribery of either team (Proposition 2) and protect the equilibrium
involving bribery of the favorite alone (Proposition 3). Here too, we can protect this result,
as long as \( h_1 \leq p_1 \). From (4) we can determine that if \( \Omega_I \in \left[ \frac{1-h_1}{1-h_1 p_1}, 1 \right] \), then \( h_1 \leq p_1 \). Then
our result in Proposition 2 eliminating bribery of either team and bribe inducement positive result of Proposition 3 both go through. Basically, if $\Omega_1$ falls below 1 but does not fall too far, our qualitative results of section 4.3 remain unaffected.

What happens if $\Omega_1$ falls further? Clearly, $h_1$ will rise above $p_1$, and at some point one of the sufficient conditions of our match-fixing equilibrium, $\pi_{20} > h_1$, may fail. In effect, ticket 2 price does not have to be reduced too far to trigger bribery of team 1. This is a deviation that could be profitable and thus the match-fixing equilibrium may be destroyed, and along with it the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium may be ruled out.

4.5 Comparing Bertrand Competition with Monopoly

So far we have not commented on an important case of the match-fixing problem: monopoly bookmaking. In a related work (Bag and Saha, 2010), we study the monopoly problem. Based on the progress of this work we can say the following. A monopolist bookmaker can control the influential punter’s bribery incentive without having to worry about losing sales to a rival. But even then it is conceivable that sometimes the monopolist may want to engineer match-fixing. Intuitively, by inducing match-fixing a monopolist would lose to the influential punter but gain from naive punters. But whether the net gain will be large enough to justify match-fixing will depend on, among other things, how close the contest is. Suppose the influential punter is not-so-powerful (low $z$) and the contest is close. In the absence of bribery the bookie does not expect to make much profit as naive punters’ bets nearly cancel out on average (due to their uniform beliefs). But by inducing bribery and lowering the price of the bribed team majority of naive punters can be directed to bet on the losing team, and the expected profit from naive punters will rise significantly, albeit at a cost – the payout to the influential punter. For small $z$, the payout will be small, and bribe inducement is likely to be optimal. This will be opposite to the competitive outcome of no bribery (Proposition 1).

For highly uneven contests, in the absence of bribery the monopolist tends to gain significantly by inducing most of naive punters to bet on the weak team. Here, the influential punter poses a threat to upset this calculation by bribing the strong team and betting on the weak team. But as long as $z$ is low, the monopolist can withstand the threat by marginally raising the price of the weak team (up to $\phi_i$). So bribe prevention is likely to be optimal here, again an outcome different from the competitive case (that of match-fixing, as shown in Proposition 3). Of course, the precise nature of the results will depend on several factors, such as $\mu_i$, $\lambda_i$ etc. But broadly speaking, we expect to see different results for monopoly when the influential punter is not so powerful.

But for the case of high $z$ (i.e. quite powerful influential punter), the monopoly outcome
may be of the following types. In close contests match-fixing is likely to be an unattractive option because of the heavy loss to the influential punter; this would be similar to the bribe prevention equilibrium under competition as shown in Proposition 4. However, under competition bribing can also occur (due to multiple equilibrium) unlike in monopoly. In highly uneven contests as well, the monopolist may not prefer match-fixing for the same reason (high $z$ resulting in high payout), but here the size of the access probability and other details can be crucial.

Overall, competition in bookmaking raises distinct strategic considerations not present in monopoly and may thus give rise to equilibrium outcomes that are very different compared to monopoly.

5. Conclusion

Table 1: Summary of match-fixing results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Close contests</th>
<th>Highly uneven contests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Punter I is not too powerful</strong></td>
<td>Bribe prevention with zero profit</td>
<td>Bribe inducement of the favorite and zero profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Punter I is powerful</strong></td>
<td>Bribe prevention with positive profit, and/or bribe inducement of either team and zero profit</td>
<td>Bribe inducement of the favorite and zero profit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Match-fixing in a number of sports and its implications for betting have attracted a great deal of media attention in recent times. Building on Shin’s (1991; 1992) horse race betting model with fixed odds, we analyze the match-fixing and bribing incentives of a potentially corrupt gambler and show how competition in bookmaking affects match-fixing, taking the anti-corruption authority’s investigation strategy as exogenous. At the set prices, the bookies are obliged to honor the bets using deep pockets. The bookies’ pricing decisions determine whether the corrupt influence comes into play or kept out. We show that competition may not always ensure zero profit, nor does it always prevent bribery. And when match-fixing is induced, often the strong team will be bribed, though in some close contests either team may be bribed. In Table 1 we present a broad summary of our results.

Acknowledgements

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Appendix A.

Proof of Proposition 1. Part (i): By construction, for any \( p_1 \in [\tilde{p}_1, \hat{p}_1] \), the ticket prices \( (\pi_1 \geq p_1, \pi_2 \geq p_2) \) imply that \( \pi_1 \geq \phi_2 \) and \( \pi_2 \geq \phi_1 \) (see Fig. 4). So by condition (2) bribery cannot occur. Then Bertrand competition would lead to the zero-profit equilibrium prices \( (\pi_1 = p_1, \pi_2 = p_2) \) for both the bookies; unilateral price reduction(s) from \( (\pi_1 = p_1, \pi_2 = p_2) \) is not feasible as it violates the Dutch-book restriction. The equilibrium is unique just like in the standard Bertrand competition game.

Part (ii): Consider \( p_1 < \tilde{p}_1 \), where the focus is restricted to bribery of team 2 only; symmetric argument will apply to \( p_1 > \hat{p}_1 \). If there is a pure strategy bribe prevention equilibrium, it must be from one of the following two price configurations:

1. \( \pi_1 = \phi_2 \) and \( \pi_2 = p_2 \). (We can rule out \( \pi_1 > \phi_2 \) and/or \( \pi_2 > p_2 \) due to Bertrand competition in each of ticket 1 and 2 respectively.)

2. \( \pi_1 \in (\psi_2, \phi_2) \) and \( \pi_2 < p_2 \), such that punter \( I \) finds bribing team 2 (when accessed) less profitable than betting on team 2; \( \psi_2 \) is defined in (3).

Of these configurations, [2] cannot be equilibrium: starting from \( \pi_2 < p_2 \), a bookie can raise only \( \pi_2 \) and avoid the loss on ticket 2.

For configuration [1], starting from \( (\pi_1 = \phi_2(p_1), \pi_2 = p_2) \) we show that a deviation in the form of slight undercutting on both tickets by one of the bookies will be profitable. In the posited equilibrium each bookie earns an overall profit (ticket index used as subscript)

\[
E \Pi_1 = y(1 - \phi_2) \left[1 - \frac{p_1}{\phi_2}\right] > 0, \text{ since } p_1 < \tilde{p}_1.
\]

Now consider the following deviation: lower \( \pi_2 \) slightly to \( \pi_2' = p_2 - \epsilon \) and choose \( \delta > 0 \) appropriately so that \( \psi_2(p_2 - \epsilon) < \pi_1' = \phi_2 - \delta < \phi_2 \); this is feasible since \( \psi_2 \) is continuous and increasing in \( \pi_2 \). Further, as \( \epsilon \) becomes small, the permissible \( \delta \) will also become small.

With this deviation bribery of team 2 is not induced; but it results in monopolization of both the markets by the deviating bookie. From ticket 2 the loss is \( \frac{y}{2} (1 - \phi_2) [-\frac{\epsilon}{p_2 - \epsilon}] \), which is approximately equal to zero for \( \epsilon \) is very small. But from ticket 1 the profit will be \( E \Pi_1' = y(1 - \phi_2 + \delta)[1 - \frac{p_1}{\phi_2 - \delta}] \), which is approximately \( 2E \Pi_1 \) (i.e. twice the posited...
equilibrium profit), for δ sufficiently small. This is a contradiction. Thus, at no prices bribery is prevented with certainty. Q.E.D.

Proof of Lemma 2. Consider \( p_1 \leq \tilde{p}_1 < 1/2 \). That \( h_1 \equiv \frac{(1-\lambda_1)p_1}{1-\lambda_1p_1} \) < \( p_1 \), i.e., \( \frac{1-\lambda_1}{1-\lambda_1p_1} < \Omega_1 \) follows from the fact that at \( p_1 = 1/2 \) we have \( \frac{1-\lambda_1}{1-\lambda_1p_1} = \frac{2(1-\lambda_1)}{(2-\lambda_1)} < \Omega_1 \) (by Assumption 3) and \( \frac{1-\lambda_1}{1-\lambda_1p_1} \) is increasing in \( p_1 \). Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 2. First we show that bribery involving only the underdog cannot be an equilibrium. Consider \( p_1 \in [0, \tilde{p}_1) \) where \( \tilde{p}_1 < 1/2 \), and suppose there is an equilibrium in which only the underdog is bribed. Then we must have, by (3) and (4),

\[
\pi_2 \leq h_1, \quad \pi_2 < p_2, \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_1 > \psi_2(\pi_2) \geq p_1,
\]

where \((\pi_1, \pi_2)\) corresponds to the symmetric price, if the markets are shared, and corresponds to the minimum price of each ticket, if prices are asymmetric leading to monopoly of at least one market. Then punter I will always bet on team 2, either by bribing team 1 or without bribing, and will never bet on team 1. Thus, if market 2 is shared, the expected profit of each bookie from ticket 2 is

\[
E\Pi_2 = \left[ \frac{y}{2}(1-\pi_2) + \frac{z}{2} \right] \left[ 1 - \frac{\mu_1(1-\lambda_1p_1) + (1-\mu_1)p_2}{\pi_2} \right],
\]

and if market 2 is not shared, one of the bookies gets \( 2E\Pi_2 \) from market 2.

In either case, since \( \pi_2 < p_2 < (1-\lambda_1p_1) \), it must be that \( E\Pi_2 < 0 \) at all \( \pi_2 \) that permits bribery of only team 1. This, we are going to argue, cannot be part of an equilibrium. To see why, first consider the case where ticket 2 market is shared by the bookies. Then one of the bookies can deviate and set a higher price for ticket 2 dumping all of his ticket 2 sale onto the other bookie and avoid the loss from ticket 2 while not affecting his profit from ticket 1; this is not consistent with equilibrium. Next consider monopoly sale of ticket 2 by one of the bookies (call him bookie 1), who must also have a positive share in ticket 1 sale yielding him a strictly positive profit because otherwise the bookie can always do better to quit both markets by setting high enough prices and avoid losses. In fact, given that bookie 1 makes a strictly positive profit from ticket 1 sale, it must be that ticket 1 market is shared with bookie 2 (by charging the same price for ticket 1 as bookie 2, bookie 1 can make a strictly positive profit which is better than his default option of no sale of ticket 1). Now bookie 1 can lower \( \pi_1 \) slightly to steal ticket 1 market from bookie 2, yielding him an improved profit; but then, again, this deviation possibility cannot be consistent with the hypothetical equilibrium.
A symmetric argument as above will apply for \( p_1 \in (\hat{p}_1, 1] \) which is the same thing as \( p_2 \in [0, \tilde{p}_2) \), ruling out bribery of only team 2 which is the weak team. Finally, as shown in Proposition 1, for \( p_1 \in [\tilde{p}_1, \hat{p}_1] \) there cannot be any bribery in equilibrium.

Next we show that bribery involving either team cannot be an equilibrium either. Suppose not, and consider \( p_1 \leq \tilde{p}_1 < 1/2 \). Then we must have, by (2), (3) and (4), and Lemma 1, one of the following three possibilities:

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_2 &\leq h_1, \quad \pi_2 < p_2, \quad \text{and} \quad p_1 < \pi_1 \leq \psi_2(\pi_2), \quad \text{(A.1)} \\
\pi_1 &\leq h_2, \quad \pi_1 < p_1, \quad \text{and} \quad p_2 < \pi_2 \leq \psi_1(\pi_1), \quad \text{(A.2)} \\
\pi_1 &> p_1, \quad \pi_2 > p_2, \quad \pi_1 < \phi_2(p_1), \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_2 < \phi_1(p_1), \quad \text{(A.3)}
\end{align*}
\]

where \((\pi_1, \pi_2)\) refers to the symmetric price, if the markets are shared, and refers to the minimum price of each ticket, if prices are asymmetric leading to monopoly in at least one market.

First, consider (A.1). Lemma 2 together with \( \tilde{p}_1 < 1/2 \) imply that \( h_1 < p_1 < p_2 \), and by construction \( \psi_2(\pi_2) < \phi_2 < p_2 \) (Fig. 2). Therefore, equilibrium prices \( \pi_1 + \pi_2 \leq \psi_2(\pi_2) + h_1 < p_2 + p_1 = 1 \) (the strict inequality follows from Lemma 2), contradicting Lemma 1.

Consider (A.2). We can write \( \pi_2 \leq \psi_1(\pi_1) < \phi_1 < p_2 \) (since \( \pi_1 < p_1 \) and the last inequality follows from Fig. 4). This contradicts the fact that \( \pi_2 > p_2 \).

Finally, consider (A.3). For \( p_1 \leq \tilde{p}_1 \), observe that \( \phi_1(p_1) < p_2 < \pi_2 \) (the first inequality follows from Fig. 4), but this contradicts \( \pi_2 < \phi_1(p_1) \).

For \( p_1 \in (\hat{p}_1, 1] \) (i.e., equivalently \( p_2 \in [0, \tilde{p}_2) \)) apply a symmetric argument as above to rule out bribery of either team, and for \( p_1 \in [\tilde{p}_1, \hat{p}_1] \) again apply Proposition 1 to rule out bribery in equilibrium. This completes the proof. Q.E.D.

**Proof of Lemma 3.** Suppose not, and assume there is a positive profit equilibrium. Suppose the prices are symmetric and they are \((\pi_1, \pi_2)\).33 Given Proposition 2, we only need to consider the case where only the favorite (i.e., team 2) is bribed. There are three possibilities for a positive profit equilibrium: positive profit (i) from both tickets, (ii) from ticket 1 only (zero profit from ticket 2), and (iii) from ticket 2 only (zero profit from ticket 1).

33The treatment of the bookies charging different prices will be similar.
In all scenarios we must have, by (3) and (4),

\[ p_1 < \pi_1 \leq \psi_2(\pi_2), \quad h_1 < \pi_2 < p_2, \]

\[ \pi_1 \geq \pi_{10}, \quad \pi_2 \geq \pi_{20}, \quad \text{with at least one strict inequality} \]

and \( \pi_1 + \pi_2 > 1, \)

where \( (\pi_{10}, \pi_{20}) \) yield zero expected profit on each ticket (for both duopoly and monopoly). Formally, \( (\pi_{10}, \pi_{20}) \) is obtained from (5) and (6). (Later in the text it will be asserted that the solution \( (\pi_{10}, \pi_{20}) \) is unique and it can be verified that the profit expressions (5) and (6) are increasing in prices at the zero-profit solution. Hence, the lower bounds \( \pi_{10} \) and \( \pi_{20} \).

If scenario (i) or (ii) occurs in equilibrium so that \( \pi_1 > \pi_{10} \), then a bookie can slightly undercut ticket 1 price, leave the bribery incentives unchanged and capture market 1; this will be a profitable deviation. So neither (i) nor (ii) can be part of an equilibrium.

So consider scenario (iii). Suppose \( (\pi_{10}, \pi_2) \) is an equilibrium price vector such that profit from ticket 1 is zero and profit from ticket 2 is strictly positive \( (\pi_2 > \pi_{20}) \). We will then have, by (3) and (4), \( h_1 < \pi_2 < p_2 \), and either (iii.a) \( p_1 < \pi_{10} < \psi_2(\pi_2) \), or (iii.b) \( p_1 < \pi_{10} = \psi_2(\pi_2) \).

In the case of (iii.a), a bookie can profitably deviate by slightly reducing \( \pi_2 \) to \( \pi_2 - \epsilon \) while leaving \( \pi_1 \) unchanged and maintaining \( \pi_1 < \psi_2(\pi_2 - \epsilon) \) (for \( \epsilon \) small enough). Ticket 2 (which yields positive profit) will be monopolized, while ticket 1 still yields zero profit; clearly this will be a profitable deviation. Thus, (iii.a) is ruled out.

Finally, consider (iii.b), and the following deviation: \( \pi_2 \) is reduced to \( \pi_2 - \epsilon \) and \( \pi_1 \) is reduced to \( \pi_{10} - \delta \) such that \( \pi_{10} - \delta = \psi_2(\pi_2 - \epsilon) \), where \( \epsilon \) is small. Both tickets 1 and 2 will be monopolized by the deviating bookie, and bribery incentives will be unaffected: \( \delta(\epsilon) = \pi_{10} - \psi_2(\pi_2 - \epsilon) \) is a continuous and increasing function of \( \epsilon \) (as \( \psi_2(.) \) is continuous and increasing), and in particular as \( \epsilon \to 0, \delta(\epsilon) \to 0 \).

Now compare the gain in market 2 with the loss in market 1. The gain in market 2 is

\[
EG(\epsilon) = (1 - \pi_2 + \epsilon)[1 - \frac{p^b_2}{\pi_2 - \epsilon}]y + (1 - \mu_2)z[1 - \frac{p_2}{\pi_2 - \epsilon}] - (1 - \pi_2)[1 - \frac{p^b_2}{\pi_2 - \epsilon}]y - (1 - \mu_2)\frac{z}{2}[1 - \frac{p_2}{\pi_2 - \epsilon}]
\]

\[
= (1 - \pi_2)[1 - \frac{p^b_2}{\pi_2 - \epsilon}]y + (1 - \mu_2)\frac{z}{2}[1 - \frac{p_2}{\pi_2 - \epsilon}] + A, \quad (A.4)
\]

where \( p^b_2 = [\mu_2 \lambda_2 + (1 - \mu_2)]p_2 \), and \( A = \epsilon[1 - \frac{p^b_2}{2(\pi_2 - \epsilon)}(1 + \frac{1}{\pi_2})] - (1 - \mu_2)\frac{p_2}{\pi_2(\pi_2 - \epsilon)} \).

In the market for ticket 1, the equilibrium price \( \pi_{10} \) yields zero profit. By deviating
from this price one earns an expected profit from ticket 1 equal to

\[ E\Pi^M_1(\epsilon) = (1 - \pi_1 + \delta)\left[1 - \frac{p_1^b}{\pi_1 - \delta}\right]y + \mu_2z\left[1 - \frac{(1 - \lambda_2p_2)}{\pi_1 - \delta}\right] \]

\[ = (1 - \pi_1)\left[1 - \frac{p_1^b}{\pi_1 - \delta}\right]y + \mu_2z\left[1 - \frac{(1 - \lambda_2p_2)}{\pi_1 - \delta}\right] + \delta\left[1 - \frac{p_1^b}{\pi_1 - \delta}\right]y, \quad (A.5) \]

where \( p_1^b = 1 - p_2^b \). As \( \epsilon \to 0 \), \( \delta(\epsilon) \to 0 \), and from (A.5) it is clear that \( E\Pi^M_1 \) approaches twice the level of expected profit per bookie from ticket 1 market before the deviation, which is equal to zero. On the other hand, from (A.4) we see that \( \lim_{\epsilon \to 0} E\Pi^M_M = (1 - \pi_2)\left[1 - \frac{p_2^b}{\pi_2}\right]y + (1 - \mu_2)\left[1 - \frac{p_2^b}{\pi_2}\right]z > 0 \) (by the premise of the equilibrium). The overall gain from deviation is \( \lim_{\epsilon \to 0} E\Pi(\epsilon) > 0 \), hence (iii.b) cannot arise in equilibrium. \hspace{1cm} \text{Q.E.D.}

Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose not. Suppose there is an equilibrium \((\pi_1, \pi_2)\) with \( \pi_1 \leq p_1 \) and \( \pi_2 \geq p_2 \), and it induces bribery of team 2. Suppose prices are asymmetric giving rise to monopoly in market 1. Then the expected profit from ticket 1 is

\[ E\Pi^b_1 = (1 - \pi_1)y\left[1 - \frac{\mu_2(1 - \lambda_2p_2) + (1 - \mu_2)p_1}{\pi_1}\right] + \mu_2z\left[1 - \frac{(1 - \lambda_2p_2)}{\pi_1}\right]. \]

Alternatively, if prices are symmetric, expected (duopoly) profit from ticket 1 is \( E\Pi^{bd}_1 = E\Pi^b_1/2 \). In either case, since \( \pi_1 \leq p_1 \leq (1 - \lambda_2p_2) \), it follows that \( E\Pi^b_1 < 0 \). Then a bookie can raise \( \pi_1 \) and avoid making losses, a contradiction. \hspace{1cm} \text{Q.E.D.}

Based on Definition 3, next we establish a technical result on \((\pi_1^{M0}, \pi_2^{M0})\) to be used below in the proof of Proposition 3.

Lemma 5. (Existence and Uniqueness of \((\pi_1^{M0}, \pi_2^{M0})\)) The bound \( \pi_1^{M0} \) exists and it is unique, if and only if \( \bar{\pi}_1 \geq \frac{y}{1+y} \).

Proof. Recall from Definition 3, \((\pi_1^{M0}, \pi_2^{M0})\) simultaneously solve \( \pi_1' = \psi_2(\pi_2') \) and \( E\Pi^M = 0 \), where \( E\Pi^M \) is given by (7). Substituting \( \pi_2 = 1 - \pi_1 \) in (7) write

\[ E\Pi^M = \frac{1}{\pi_1(1 - \pi_1)}\left[-(1 + y)\pi_1^2 + (y + p_1(1 + y))\pi_1 - p_1y\right]. \]

Below we first observe certain properties of the \( E\Pi^M(\ldots) \) function with direct reference to the \((\pi_2, \pi_1)\)-plane so that the proof of this lemma can be understood with the help of Figs. 5a and 5b; these Figures are not exhaustive though.
Properties:

[1] There are only two solutions to \( E\Pi^M(\pi_1, \pi_2) = 0 \) and \( \pi_1 + \pi_2 = 1 \), viz.,
\[
(\pi_1 = p_1, \pi_2 = p_2), \quad (\pi_1 = \frac{y}{1+y}, \pi_2 = \frac{1}{1+y}).
\]

Given these and since \( E\Pi^M\big|_{\pi_1+\pi_2=1} < 0 \) at \( \pi_1 = 0 \) and \( \pi_1 = 1 \), we conclude that:

If \( p_1 < \frac{y}{1+y} \) then
\[
E\Pi^M > 0 \quad \text{at all } \pi_1 \in \left(p_1, \frac{y}{1+y}\right) \quad \text{and } \pi_2 = 1 - \pi_1;
\]
\[
E\Pi^M < 0 \quad \text{at all } \pi_1 < p_1 \quad \text{as well as } \pi_1 > \frac{y}{1+y} \quad \text{and } \pi_2 = 1 - \pi_1.
\]

Alternatively, if \( p_1 > \frac{y}{1+y} \) then
\[
E\Pi^M > 0 \quad \text{at all } \pi_1 \in \left(\frac{y}{1+y}, p_1\right) \quad \text{and } \pi_2 = 1 - \pi_1;
\]
\[
E\Pi^M < 0 \quad \text{at all } \pi_1 < \frac{y}{1+y} \quad \text{as well as } \pi_1 > p_1 \quad \text{and } \pi_2 = 1 - \pi_1.
\]

[2] Graphically, on the \((\pi_2, \pi_1)\)-plane the iso-profit curve \( E\Pi^M = 0 \) intersects the \( \pi_1 + \pi_2 = 1 \) at two points identified in property [1]. The segment of the iso-profit curve lying strictly below the \( \pi_1 + \pi_2 = 1 \) line violates the Dutch-book restriction and therefore is discarded in our search for \((\pi_1^M, \pi_2^M)\), as indicated by the dotted part (of the curve) in Figs. 5a,b.

[3] \( E\Pi^M \) is continuous at all \( \{(\pi_1, \pi_2)|\pi_1 + \pi_2 \geq 1, \pi_1 \leq 1, \pi_2 \leq 1\} \). Further, from \( \frac{\partial E\Pi^M}{\partial \pi_2} = -y + \frac{p_2}{\pi_2^2} \) we can conclude that
\[
E\Pi^M \text{ is increasing (decreasing) in } \pi_2 \text{ at all } \pi_2 < (>) \sqrt{p_2/y}.
\]

Similarly, from \( \frac{\partial E\Pi^M}{\partial \pi_1} = y\left[ -1 + \frac{p_1}{\pi_1^2}\right] \) we can conclude that
\[
E\Pi^M \text{ is increasing (decreasing) in } \pi_1 \text{ at all } \pi_1 < (>) \sqrt{p_1}.
\]

[4] Consider a subset of the feasible prices: \( \pi_2 \leq p_2 \) and \( \pi_1 \geq p_1 \) in the region \( \pi_1 + \pi_2 \geq 1 \).
Then properties [1] and [3] together imply that all points to the right of the iso-profit curve \( E\Pi^M = 0 \) yield \( E\Pi^M > 0 \) and all points to the left of the iso-profit curve \( E\Pi^M = 0 \) yield \( E\Pi^M < 0 \) (since \( E\Pi^M \) is increasing in \( \pi_2 \)).

[5] We also specifically note the following (\( b \) follows from property [4]):

(a) At \( \pi_2 = p_2 \) and \( \pi_1 = 1 \), \( E\Pi^M = 0 \).
We claim the following:

conclude the following:

that \( \psi \) properties [5]

\[ \pi \] above) and \( \pi \) is increasing in \( \pi \).

Next, we search for (\( \pi_1, \pi_2 \)) such that \( E\Pi^M = 0 \) where

\[ \pi_2 \leq p_2, \quad \pi_1 \geq p_1, \text{ and } \pi_1 + \pi_2 \geq 1. \]

We claim the following:

For any \( \pi_1 \geq \max\{p_1, \frac{y}{1+y}\} \), if \( E\Pi^M(\pi_1, \pi_2 = 1 - \pi_1) \leq 0 \) then there exists a unique \( \pi_2 \leq p_2 \) such that \( E\Pi^M(\pi_1, \pi_2) = 0 \).

By property [1], at any \( \pi_1 \geq \max\{p_1, \frac{y}{1+y}\} \) we have \( E\Pi^M(\pi_1, \pi_2 = 1 - \pi_1) \) \( \leq 0 \), and by property [5.b] we have \( E\Pi^M(\pi_1, p_2) \geq 0 \). Now, since \( E\Pi^M(.) \) is continuous in \( \pi_2 \) over \([1 - \pi_1, p_2] \) for any \( \pi_1 \geq \max\{p_1, \frac{y}{1+y}\} \), by applying the intermediate value theorem we can conclude the following:

[A1] For every \( \pi_1 \in [\max\{p_1, \frac{y}{1+y}\}, 1] \), there must exist some \( \tilde{\pi}_2(\pi_1) \in [1 - \pi_1, p_2] \) such that

\[ E\Pi^M(\tilde{\pi}_2(\pi_1), \pi_1) = 0. \]

Implicitly \( \tilde{\pi}_2(\pi_1) \) solves \( E\Pi^M(\pi_1, \pi_2) = 0 \). Note in particular that \( \tilde{\pi}_2(\pi_1 = p_1) = p_2, \tilde{\pi}_2(\pi_1 = 1) = p_2, \tilde{\pi}_2(\frac{y}{1+y}) = \frac{1}{1+y} \) and also \( \tilde{\pi}_2(\phi_2) < p_2 \) (the last inequality being implied by properties [5.b] and [4]). The solution \( \tilde{\pi}_2(\pi_1) \) is also unique because, by property [3], \( E\Pi^M \) is increasing in \( \pi_2 < \sqrt{p_2/y} \). This establishes our above claim.

Further, since \( \frac{\partial E\Pi^M}{\partial \pi_2} \neq 0 \) by applying the implicit function theorem we conclude:

[A2] \( \tilde{\pi}_2(.) \) is a continuous function.

Now we are going to show that (refer Definitions 2 and 3):

If \( \tilde{\pi}_1 \geq \frac{y}{1+y} \) (or equivalently \( \tilde{\pi}_2 \leq \frac{1}{1+y} \)), there must exist a unique value of \( \pi_1 \geq \tilde{\pi}_1 \), namely \( \pi_1^M \), such that \( \pi_1 = \psi_2(\tilde{\pi}_2(\pi_1)) \).

First consider the case \( p_1 > \frac{y}{1+y} \). Since \( \tilde{\pi}_1 > p_1 \), it follows that \( \tilde{\pi}_1 > \frac{y}{1+y} \). It is also clear that \( \psi_2(\tilde{\pi}_2(p_1)) = \psi_2(p_2) = \phi_2 > p_1 \), and \( \psi_2(\tilde{\pi}_2(\phi_2)) < \phi_2 \) because \( \tilde{\pi}_2(\phi_2) < p_2 \) (as observed above) and \( \psi_2(.) \) is increasing in \( \pi_2 \). Now define the composite function

\[ \eta(\pi_1) = \psi_2(\tilde{\pi}_2(\pi_1)) - \pi_1, \]

which will be continuous in \( \pi_1 \) (using [A2]), and using the fact that \( \eta(p_1) > 0 \) and \( \eta(\phi_2) < 0 \), we can appeal to the intermediate value theorem to conclude that there must exist at least
one \( \pi_1^{M_0} \in (p_1, \phi_2) \) such that \( \eta(\pi_1^{M_0}) = 0 \). Denote \( \pi_2^{M_0} = \hat{\pi}_2(\pi_1^{M_0}) \); it can be verified that \( \pi_2^{M_0} \in (\tilde{\pi}_2, p_2) \). (Note that this case is not covered by Figs. 5a,b.)

Next, consider the case \( p_1 \leq \frac{y}{1+y} \), and continue to assume that \( \tilde{\pi}_1 \geq \frac{1}{1+y} \) (or equivalently \( \tilde{\pi}_2 \leq \frac{1}{1+y} \)). We note that \( \psi_2(\hat{\pi}_2(\frac{y}{1+y})) = \psi_2(\frac{1}{1+y}) \geq \psi_2(\tilde{\pi}_2) = \tilde{\pi}_1 \geq \frac{y}{1+y} \). That is, \( \eta(\frac{y}{1+y}) \geq 0 \), where \( \eta(\tilde{\pi}_1) \) is the same composite function as defined in the earlier case. On the other hand, \( \psi_2(\hat{\pi}_2(\phi_2)) < \phi_2 \) (already noted) implying \( \eta(\phi_2) < 0 \). Given that \( \hat{\pi}_1 < \phi_2 \) (by definition) and \( \tilde{\pi}_1 \geq \frac{1}{1+y} \), we have \( \frac{y}{1+y} < \phi_2 \). By the intermediate value theorem, once again there exists at least one \( \pi_1^{M_0} \in [\frac{y}{1+y}, \phi_2) \) such that \( \eta(\pi_1^{M_0}) = 0 \). Again, denote \( \pi_2^{M_0} = \hat{\pi}_2(\pi_1^{M_0}) \). (This case is shown in Fig. 5b.)

At the minimal (as well as maximal) \( \pi_1^{M_0} \) such that \( \eta(\pi_1^{M_0}) = 0 \), it is easy to see that we must have \( \eta'(\tilde{\pi}_1) < 0 \). This implies \( \psi_2'(\cdot) \cdot \frac{d\psi_2}{d\tilde{\pi}_1} < 1 \). Since \( \frac{1}{\psi_2(\tilde{\pi}_2)} = \psi_2^{-1}(\tilde{\pi}_1) \) (because of continuity and monotonicity of \( \psi_2(\cdot) \)), at \( \pi_1^{M_0} \) the following must hold when \( \frac{d\psi_2}{d\tilde{\pi}_1} > 0 \):

\[
\frac{d\tilde{\pi}_2}{d\pi_1} < \psi_2^{-1}(\cdot), \quad \text{or equivalently } \frac{d\pi_1}{d\pi_2} \bigg|_{EIP^M=0} > \psi_2'(\cdot). \tag{A.6}
\]

Note that this condition is met at \( \pi_1^{M_0} \) and the inequality is maintained thereafter. That is to say, \( \pi_1^{M_0} \) is unique. This is confirmed by checking the curvatures of the zero iso-profit curve and the \( \psi_2(\cdot) \) curve and the fact that \( \hat{\pi}_2(\phi_2) < p_2 \) and \( \psi_2^{-1}(\phi_2) = p_2 \) (see Fig. 5b).

On the \((\pi_2, \pi_1)\)-plane the iso-profit curve is concave when rising and convex when declining. This can be verified (which we leave out) by differentiating the following slope expression:

\[
\frac{d\pi_1}{d\pi_2} \bigg|_{EIP^M=0} = \left( \frac{\pi_1^2}{\pi_2^2} \right) \left[ \frac{\pi_2}{y} - \frac{\pi_2^2}{\pi_1^2 - p_1} \right].
\]

As shown in Fig. 5b these two curves can intersect only once and the iso-profit curve will cut the bribery indifference curve from below, which confirms the slope condition (A.6).

If they were to intersect twice, the iso-profit curve must fall below the bribery indifference curve at \( \pi_2 = p_2 \); but we know that that is impossible, because at \( \pi_2 = p_2 \) and \( \pi_1 \in (p_1, \phi_2) \) the no-bribery monopoly profit is strictly positive by property [5,b].

On the other hand, if \( \tilde{\pi}_1 < \frac{y}{1+y} \), which is shown in Fig. 5a, at all \( \pi_1 \in [\tilde{\pi}_1, \frac{y}{1+y}] \), \( EIP^M(\pi_1, 1-\pi_1) \geq 0 \) (by property [1]) and therefore there cannot be any \( \hat{\pi}_2(\pi_1) \) such that \( \psi_2(\hat{\pi}_2(\pi_1)) = \pi_1 \), because \( \hat{\pi}_2(\pi_1) \) does not exist (in our feasible region). That is to say, \( \pi_1^{M_0} \) does not exist. Now consider any \( \pi_1 \in [\frac{y}{1+y}, \phi_2] \), if this range is non-empty. Here too, \( \pi_1^{M_0} \) does not exist because \( \eta(\pi_1) < 0 \).

\textbf{Q.E.D.}

\textbf{Proof of Proposition 3.} The uniqueness of \((\pi_{10}, \pi_{20})\) is guaranteed by the uniqueness of solution to eqs. (5) and (6) (see footnote 24). The three conditions together are both
necessary and sufficient.

The necessity of the first two conditions is obvious. If \( \pi_{10} > \psi_2(\pi_{20}) \) and/or \( \pi_{20} \leq h_1 \), team 2 will not be bribed and/or team 1 will be bribed due to violations of conditions (3) and/or (4). For the third condition, the necessity part will be established along with sufficiency. For the first two deviations, only sufficiency needs to be established. In what follows we address each deviation.

1. Ruling out of deviation (i). Suppose bookie 1 engages in deviation (i). As a result, he captures all of ticket 2 sale. As for ticket 1 market, there are three subcases:

   (a) \( \pi'_1 > \pi_{10} \);  
   (b) \( \pi'_1 = \pi_{10} \);  
   (c) \( \pi'_1 < \pi_{10} \).

In subcase (a), bookie 1 off-loads all of ticket 1 sale to bookie 2. Ticket 2 will be bought by punter \( I \) (whether he manages to bribe team 1 or not) and a section of the ordinary punters. The deviation profit of bookie 1 from the sale of ticket 2 is

\[
[y(1 - \pi'_2) + z][1 - \frac{\mu_1(1 - \lambda_1p_1) + (1 - \mu_1)p_2}{\pi'_2}].
\]

This expression is negative because \( \pi'_2 < \pi_{20} < p_2 < \mu_1(1 - \lambda_1p_1) + (1 - \mu_1)p_2 \). Thus deviation subcase (a) is ruled out.

In the subcases (b) and (c), bookie 1 at least shares the market for ticket 1. That is, he will be selling both tickets. We know, under this deviation \( \pi'_2 \leq h_1 \) and by Lemma 2 \( h_1 < p_1 \), so together \( \pi'_2 < p_1 \). As for ticket 1 price, \( \pi_{10} \leq \psi_2(\pi_{20}) < \phi_2 \) for \( \pi_{20} < p_2 \) (from (2) and (3), it follows that \( \psi_2(\pi_{20}) < \phi_2 \)). Also, \( \phi_2 < p_2 \) for \( \tilde{p}_1 < 1/2 \) (see Fig. 4), and so \( \pi_{10} < p_2 \). Thus \( \pi'_1 + \pi'_2 \leq \pi_{10} + \pi'_2 < p_2 + p_1 = 1 \), which is a violation of the Dutch-book restriction, hence the deviations (b) and (c) cannot be feasible.

2. Ruling out of deviation (ii). Next, consider deviation (ii) (again by bookie 1), so that \( p_1 < \min\{\pi'_1, \pi_{10}\} \leq \psi_2(\pi'_2) \) and \( \pi'_2 \leq h_1 < p_1 \) (the last inequality follows from Lemma 2). Punter \( I \) will bribe whichever team he gets access to, and bet on the other team; and if \( I \) gets access to neither team, he will bet on team 2. As before bookie 1 will capture all of market 2, and will face one of three following scenarios in market 1 depending on \( \pi'_1 \):

   (d) \( \pi'_1 > \pi_{10} \);  
   (e) \( \pi'_1 = \pi_{10} \);  
   (f) \( \pi'_1 < \pi_{10} \).

First consider the subcases (e) and (f), where \( \pi'_1 \leq \pi_{10} \). Here too bookie 1 sells both tickets, and once again we will have the violation of the Dutch-book restriction: \( \pi'_1 + \pi'_2 \leq \pi_{10} + \pi'_2 < p_2 + p_1 = 1 \) (note that \( \pi_{10} < p_2 \) follows precisely the same way as derived above when ruling out subcases (b) and (c) for deviation (i)). So the deviations (e) and (f) will not be feasible.
Finally, consider subcase (d) where bookie 1 does not sell ticket 1. Bookie 1’s payoff from deviation is calculated as follows:

\[
(1 - \pi_2')\left[1 - \frac{\mu_2 \lambda_2 p_2 + \mu_1 (1 - \lambda_1 p_1) + (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) p_2}{\pi_2'}\right] y \\
+ (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) z\left[1 - \frac{p_2}{\pi_2'}\right] + \mu_1 z\left[1 - \frac{1 - \lambda_1 p_1}{\pi_2'}\right].
\]

(A.7)

Profit from punter \(I\) (i.e., the last two bracketed terms of (A.7)) is negative, given that \(\pi_2' < p_2 < (1 - \lambda_1 p_1)\). The profit from the naive punters (which is given by the first term) will also be negative if

\[
\pi_2' < \mu_2 \lambda_2 p_2 + \mu_1 (1 - \lambda_1 p_1) + (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) p_2.
\]

(A.8)

We claim that the RHS of (A.8) is strictly greater than \(p_1\), i.e.,

\[
p_2 \left[(1 - \mu_2) + \mu_2 \lambda_2\right] + p_1 \left[\mu_1 - \mu_1 \lambda_1\right] > p_1,
\]

or,

\[
p_2 \left[(1 - \mu_2) + \mu_2 \lambda_2\right] > p_1 \left[(1 - \mu_1) + \mu_1 \lambda_1\right],
\]

which is true by Assumption 4. On the other hand, using Lemma 2, \(\pi_2' \leq h_1 < p_1\). So (A.8) is established and hence profit from the naive punters is negative, making the proposed deviation unprofitable.

3. **Ruling out of deviation (iii)**. Finally, consider deviation (iii) (again by bookie 1), following which there will be no attempt at bribery. There are two cases to consider.

**Case 1** (\(\bar{\pi}_1 < \frac{y}{1+y}\)). Deviation to no-bribery prices is ruled out if and only if \(\pi_{10} \leq \bar{\pi}_1\). First consider sufficiency. We begin by noting that since \(\pi_{10} + \pi_{20} > 1\), \(\pi_{10} \leq \bar{\pi}_1\) implies \(\pi_{20} > \bar{\pi}_2\) (= 1 − \(\bar{\pi}_1\)). Now let the deviation prices \((\pi_1', \pi_2')\) be such that \(\pi_1' \leq \pi_{10} \leq \bar{\pi}_1\), \(\pi_2' < \pi_{20}\), and contrary to the claim suppose \(\pi_1' > \psi_2(\pi_2')\), which can be written as \(\pi_2' < \psi_2^{-1}(\pi_1')\). But \(\psi_2^{-1}(\pi_1') \leq \psi_2^{-1}(\bar{\pi}_1) = \bar{\pi}_2\), and hence \(\pi_2' < \bar{\pi}_2\). Therefore, \(\pi_1' + \pi_2' < 1\) which violates the Dutch-book restriction, and thus this deviation is not possible.

Now consider the necessity part. Suppose \(\pi_{10} > \bar{\pi}_1\) (as in \(w'\) in Fig. 5a); then there is a pair of prices \((\pi_1', \pi_2')\) such that \(\pi_1' \leq \pi_{10}, \pi_2' < \pi_{20}\), satisfying \(\pi_1' > \psi_2(\pi_2')\), the Dutch-book restriction, and yielding, as shown in the proof of Lemma 5, \(\Pi^M > 0\) (see point d in Fig. 5a). Thus, the proposed deviation is profitable. ||

**Case 2** (\(\bar{\pi}_1 \geq \frac{y}{1+y}\)). Deviation to no-bribery prices is ruled out if and only if \(\pi_{10} \leq \pi_1^{AM}\). We begin with sufficiency. Suppose there is a pair of prices \((\pi_1', \pi_2')\) such that \(\pi_1' \leq \pi_{10}, \pi_2' < \pi_{20}\), satisfying \(\pi_1' > \psi_2(\pi_2')\), \(\pi_1' + \pi_2' \geq 1\) and yielding, contrary to
our claim, $E\Pi^M > 0$. As $E\Pi^M(\pi_1', \pi_2') > 0$, we must have $\hat{\pi}_2(\pi_1') < \pi_2'$ (because by reducing $\pi_2'$, profit can be reduced to zero; see Fig. 5b). Then we should also have $\psi_2(\hat{\pi}_2(\pi_1')) < \pi_1'$ leading to $\eta(\pi_1') = \psi_2(\hat{\pi}_2(\pi_1')) - \pi_1' < 0$. But this is a contradiction to the fact that $\eta(\pi_1') \geq 0$ at $\pi_1' \leq \pi_1^{Mo}$ (as $\pi_1^{Mo}$ was the minimal $\pi_1$ at which $\eta = 0$, as argued in the proof of Lemma 5).

Now consider the necessity part. Suppose $\pi_{10} > \pi_1^{Mo}$ (as in $w'$ in Fig. 5b); then there is a pair of prices $(\pi_1', \pi_2')$ such that $\pi_1' \leq \pi_{10}$, $\pi_2' < \pi_{20}$, satisfying $\pi_1' > \psi_2(\pi_2')$, the Dutch-book restriction, and yielding $E\Pi^M > 0$ (see point d in Fig. 5b). Thus, the proposed deviation is profitable.

This completes the proof of Proposition 3. \hspace{1cm} Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 4.** Below we derive conditions that would guarantee the particular type of positive profit, price coordination equilibrium in which bribery is prevented. Example 2 towards the end of this Appendix shows that the conditions are not vacuous.

**Slight undercutting on both tickets:** By undercutting on both tickets, $\pi_1' \in (p_1, \phi_2)$, $\pi_2' \in (p_2, \phi_1)$, bookie 1 earns the following profit:

$$E\Pi_{BI} = \mu_1 \left[ \int_{\pi_1'}^{1} \left( 1 - \frac{\lambda_1 p_1}{\pi_1'} \right) dq + \int_{0}^{1-\pi_1'} \left( 1 - \frac{\lambda_1 p_1}{\pi_2'} \right) dq \right] \equiv k_1 + \mu_2 \left[ \int_{\pi_1'}^{1} \left( 1 - \frac{\lambda_2 p_2}{\pi_1'} \right) dq + \int_{0}^{1-\pi_1'} \left( 1 - \frac{\lambda_2 p_2}{\pi_2'} \right) dq \right] \equiv k_2 + (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2) y[3 - \pi_1' - \pi_2' - \frac{p_1}{\pi_1'} - \frac{p_2}{\pi_2']] + z \left[ \mu_1 \left\{ 1 - \frac{1 - \lambda_1 p_1}{\pi_2'} \right\} + \mu_2 \left\{ 1 - \frac{1 - \lambda_2 p_2}{\pi_2'} \right\} \right]. \hspace{1cm} (A.9)$$

Let $\pi_1' = \phi_2 - \epsilon_1$ and $\pi_2' = \phi_1 - \epsilon_2$, $\epsilon_1$ and $\epsilon_2$ both arbitrarily small. Since $y[3 - \pi_1' - \pi_2' - \frac{p_1}{\pi_1'} - \frac{p_2}{\pi_2']] \approx 2k$, we rewrite (A.9) as:

$$E\Pi_{BI} \approx \mu_1 k_1 + \mu_2 k_2 + (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2)2k - z \left[ \mu_1 \left( 1 - \frac{1 - \lambda_1 p_1}{\phi_1} \right) + \mu_2 \left( 1 - \frac{1 - \lambda_2 p_2}{\phi_2} \right) - (\mu_1 + \mu_2) \right]. \hspace{1cm} (A.10)$$

The first (and second) term(s) in (A.10) indicate expected profit from naive punters when team 1 (team 2) is bribed. The third term captures the no-bribery profit; this is twice the bribe prevention duopoly profit due to monopolization of both markets. The fourth term
is the expected net payout to punter $I$ which is positive-valued. If $\mu_1 + \mu_2$ is sufficiently large (say, $\mu_1 + \mu_2 \to 1$), the magnitude of $E\Pi_{BI}$ will crucially depend on the magnitude of $\mu_1 k_1 + \mu_2 k_2$. If $\max\{k_1, k_2\}$ is not too large relative to $k$ (or is smaller than $k$), then clearly $E\Pi_{BI} < k = E\Pi_{BP}$ (note that the third term approaches zero while the fourth term is negative-valued). On the other hand, by letting $\mu_1 + \mu_2 \to 0$ we will get $E\Pi_{BI} = 2k > k$.

Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem:

There exists $\mu_1 + \mu_2 = \bar{\mu}$ such that $E\Pi_{BI}(\bar{\mu}) = k$.

If there are multiple $\bar{\mu}$ then we take the largest $\bar{\mu}$ to be our threshold $\mu_1 + \mu_2$. Thus, slight undercutting on both tickets is unprofitable, if $\mu_1 + \mu_2 \geq \bar{\mu}$.

**Slight undercutting on ticket 1 alone:** Now consider the possibility that the price of ticket 1 is reduced slightly below $\phi_2$, while the price of ticket 2 is held at $\phi_1$. The market for ticket 1 is captured, but then team 2 will be bribed with probability $\mu_2$ in which case punter $I$ will bet on ticket 1. Let us set in eq. (A.9), $\pi'_2 = \phi_1$, $\mu_1 = 0$, and adjust for sharing of market 2. Then we write the first bookie’s deviation payoff as:

$$E\Pi_{BI} \approx \mu_2 k_2 + (1 - \mu_2)k - \mu_2 z\left[1 - \frac{\lambda_2 p_2}{\phi_2}\right] - 1$$

$$-\mu_2 \frac{y}{2} \left[(1 - \phi_1)(1 - \frac{\lambda_2 p_2}{\phi_1})\right] + (1 - \mu_2) \frac{y}{2} \left[(1 - \phi_2)(1 - \frac{p_1}{\phi_2})\right].$$

The first, third and fourth terms together capture the profit in the event of bribery; of these the third term indicates the net loss to punter $I$. Here since market 2 is not captured, the profit is less than $k_2$. The second and fifth terms together give the profit in the event of no-bribery. The no-bribery profit is greater than $k$ because of the capturing of market 1. Therefore, $E\Pi_{BI} < k$ if $\mu_2$ satisfies the following condition:

$$\mu_2 \geq \frac{\frac{y}{2} \left[(1 - \phi_2)(1 - \frac{p_1}{\phi_2})\right]}{\frac{y}{2} \left[(1 - \phi_2)(1 - \frac{p_1}{\phi_2})\right] + \frac{y}{2} \left[(1 - \phi_1)(1 - \frac{\lambda_2 p_2}{\phi_1})\right] + z \left[(1 - \frac{\lambda_2 p_2}{\phi_2}) - 1\right] + (k - k_2)} \equiv \mu_2^*.$$

---

34 For example, consider $\mu_1 = \mu_2 = 1/2$, $\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = 0$, and $\Omega_1 = \Omega_2 = \Omega (= F/z$ where $F = w + \alpha(f + f_1)$). Then we have $\phi_1 = \phi_2 = 1/(1 + \Omega)$. This gives $k = \frac{y \Omega (1 - \Omega)}{2(1 + \Omega)}$ and $E\Pi_{BI} = 2k - z\Omega$. Now $E\Pi_{BI} < E\Pi_{BP}$ requires $3z^2 - (1 - F)z + F > 0$, which will be definitely true for $z$ near both zero and one.

35 Under plausible assumptions $\bar{\mu}$ can be unique. For example, when $\mu_1 = \mu_2 (\equiv \mu)$, $\frac{2E\Pi_{BI}d\mu}{d\mu} = k_1 + k_2 - 4k - z \left[\frac{1 - \lambda_2 p_2}{\phi_1} + \frac{1 - \lambda_2 p_2}{\phi_2} - 2\right] < 0$ would guarantee a unique threshold $\bar{\mu}$. More generally, $\mu_1$ and $\mu_2$ can be varied in the same proportion to check how $E\Pi_{BI}$ behaves with respect to $\mu_1 + \mu_2$.  

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Upon simplification, we obtain

\[
\mu_2^* = \frac{y \{ (1 - \phi_2)(1 - \frac{p_1}{\phi_2}) \}}{yp_2(1 - \lambda_2)\left[\frac{2}{\phi_2} - \frac{1 + \phi_1}{\phi_1}\right] + 2z \Omega_2(1 - \lambda_2 p_2)}, \tag{A.11}
\]

**Slight undercutting on ticket 2 alone:** The analysis is similar to the previous case. Now ticket 2 price is lowered slightly below \(\phi_1\), while \(\pi_1' = \phi_2\). Bookie 1’s deviation profit can be calculated (by setting \(\mu_2 = 0\) in (A.9)) as

\[
E\Pi_{BI} \approx \mu_1 k_1 + (1 - \mu_1)k - \mu_1 z \left[ \frac{(1 - \lambda_1 p_1)}{\phi_1} - 1 \right] - \mu_1 \frac{y}{2} \left( (1 - \phi_2)(1 - \frac{\lambda_1 p_1}{\phi_2}) \right) + (1 - \mu_1) \frac{y}{2} \left( (1 - \phi_1)(1 - \frac{p_2}{\phi_1}) \right).
\]

The deviation can be ruled out if

\[
\mu_1 \geq \frac{\frac{y}{2} \left( (1 - \phi_1)(1 - \frac{p_2}{\phi_1}) \right) + \frac{y}{2} \left( (1 - \phi_2)(1 - \frac{\lambda_1 p_1}{\phi_2}) \right) + \frac{z\mu_1(1 - \lambda_1 p_1)}{\phi_1} - 1 + (k - k_1)}{\frac{y}{2} \left( (1 - \phi_1)(1 - \frac{p_2}{\phi_1}) \right) + \frac{y}{2} \left( (1 - \phi_2)(1 - \frac{\lambda_1 p_1}{\phi_2}) \right) + \frac{z\mu_1(1 - \lambda_1 p_1)}{\phi_1} - 1 + (k - k_1)} \equiv \mu_1^*.
\]

Upon simplification, we obtain

\[
\mu_1^* = \frac{y \{ (1 - \phi_1)(1 - \frac{p_2}{\phi_1}) \}}{yp_1(1 - \lambda_1)\left[\frac{2}{\phi_1} - \frac{1 + \phi_2}{\phi_2}\right] + 2z \Omega_1(1 - \lambda_1 p_1)}, \tag{A.12}
\]

**Large-scale undercutting on both tickets:** However, the above conditions do not apply to large-scale deviations. What if the prices are significantly reduced and profit rises? Let \(\rho\) denote the ex-ante probability of team 1 winning (from the bookie’s point of view) when either team may be bribed, where \(\rho = \mu_1 \lambda_1 p_1 + \mu_2 (1 - \lambda_2 p_2) + (1 - \mu_1 - \mu_2)p_1\).

The deviating bookie’s bribe inducement problem is to maximize:

\[
E\Pi_{BI} = y \left[ 3 - \pi_1' - \pi_2' - \frac{\rho}{\pi_1'} - \frac{(1 - \rho)}{\pi_2'} \right] - z \left[ \mu_1 \left( \frac{1 - \lambda_1 p_1}{\pi_2'} \right) + \mu_2 \left( \frac{1 - \lambda_2 p_2}{\pi_1'} \right) - (\mu_1 + \mu_2) \right],
\]

subject to \(p_1 \leq \pi_1' < \phi_2\) and \(p_2 \leq \pi_2' < \phi_1\).

The unconstrained solutions (ignoring the two constraints) are:

\[
\pi_1^* = \sqrt{\rho + \frac{z\mu_2(1 - \lambda_2 p_2)}{y}}, \quad \pi_2^* = \sqrt{(1 - \rho) + \frac{z\mu_1(1 - \lambda_1 p_1)}{y}}.
\]

If \(\pi_1^* \geq \phi_2\) and \(\pi_2^* \geq \phi_1\) as in (8), then \(E\Pi_{BI}\) must be non-decreasing at \(\pi_1' \leq \phi_2\) and \(\pi_2' \leq \phi_1\). Therefore, the deviating bookie would like to capture both markets only by undercutting slightly. ||
There are two other possible deviations: large-scale undercutting of ticket 1 only, and of ticket 2 only. We next show that by ruling out large-scale undercutting of both tickets, these last two deviations are also ruled out.

**Large-scale undercutting on ticket 2 alone:** As before, we should take into account undercutting of only one ticket. Suppose only ticket 2 is undercut, and ticket 1’s price is held at $\phi_2$. In this case, punter $I$ will bribe team 1 (on access) and bet on team 2. Market 1 is shared, but market 2 is fully captured. Let the probability of team 1 winning in this case be denoted as $\rho_1$. We can easily calculate

$$\rho_1 = \mu_1\lambda_1p_1 + (1 - \mu_1)p_1.$$ 

Now maximize

$$E\Pi_{BI} = \frac{y}{2}[(1 - \phi_2)(1 - \frac{\rho_1}{\phi_2})] + \frac{y}{2}[2 - \rho_1 - \pi_2 - (1 - \rho_1)\frac{\rho_1}{\pi_2}] - \mu_1z\left[\frac{(1 - \lambda_1p_1)}{\pi_2} - 1\right]$$

with respect to $\pi_2$ subject to the constraints: $\pi_2 < \phi_1$, $\pi_1 = \phi_2$ and $\pi_2 + \phi_2 \geq 1$.

The unconstrained solution for $\pi_2$ is

$$\pi_2 = \sqrt{(1 - \rho_1) + \frac{z\mu_1(1 - \lambda_1p_1)}{y}}.$$ 

**Large-scale undercutting on ticket 1 alone:** Similarly consider the case where only ticket 1 is undercut, and ticket 2’s price is held at $\phi_2$. Here, team 2 will be bribed (on access) and bets will be placed on team 1 (by punter $I$). Market 2 is shared, but market 1 is captured. Let the new probability of team 1 winning be denoted as $\rho_2$, where

$$\rho_2 = \mu_2(1 - \lambda_2p_2) + (1 - \mu_2)p_1.$$ 

The bookie should then choose $\pi_1$ to maximize

$$E\Pi_{BI} = y\left[1 + \rho_2 - \pi_1 - \frac{\rho_2}{\pi_1}\right] + \frac{y}{2}\left[(1 - \phi_1)(1 - \frac{(1 - \rho_2)}{\phi_1})\right] - \mu_2z\left[\frac{(1 - \lambda_2p_2)}{\pi_1} - 1\right]$$

subject to the constraints: $\pi_1 < \phi_2$, $\pi_2 = \phi_1$ and $\pi_1 + \phi_1 \geq 1$.

The unconstrained solution for $\pi_1$ is

$$\pi_1 = \sqrt{\rho_2 + \frac{z\mu_2(1 - \lambda_2p_2)}{y}}.$$ 

It can be readily seen that since $\lambda_1p_1 < p_1 < 1 - \lambda_2p_2$, we have $\rho_1 < \rho < \rho_2$ and
(1 − ρ_2) < (1 − ρ) < (1 − ρ_1). This implies

\[
\sqrt{\rho + \frac{z\mu_2(1 - \lambda_2 p_2)}{y}} < \sqrt{\rho_2 + \frac{z\mu_2(1 - \lambda_2 p_2)}{y}},
\]

\[
\sqrt{(1 - \rho) + \frac{z\mu_1(1 - \lambda_1 p_1)}{y}} < \sqrt{(1 - \rho_1) + \frac{z\mu_1(1 - \lambda_1 p_1)}{y}}.
\]

Therefore, if large-scale undercutting on both tickets is ruled out by ensuring \(\sqrt{\rho + \frac{z\mu_2(1 - \lambda_2 p_2)}{y}} \geq \phi_2\) and \(\sqrt{(1 - \rho) + \frac{z\mu_1(1 - \lambda_1 p_1)}{y}} \geq \phi_1\), then large-scale single price undercutting is also ruled out.

Q.E.D.

**Example 1.** To illustrate the existence of the equilibrium in Proposition 3, we consider some numerical parameter configurations in Table 2 that satisfy the equilibrium conditions.

Suppose conditions are symmetric for both teams. First assume \(\Omega_1 = \Omega_2 = 2, \mu_1 = \mu_2 = 0.15, \lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = 0.5, \) and \(z = 0.3 \) (and \(y = 0.7\)); see the first column. In the second column \(\lambda_1, \lambda_2\) are reduced to 0.3. In the third column \(\lambda_1\) and \(\lambda_2\) are both further reduced to zero, but at the same time \(z\) is raised to 0.5 (and \(y\) lowered to 0.5) leading to a fall in \(\Omega_1\) and \(\Omega_2\) to 1.2.

For the parameter specification in column 1, \(\tilde{p}_1 = 0.28\) and \(\hat{p}_1 = 0.72\). This column represents the case of \(\pi_1 < \frac{\mu_2}{1 + y} = 0.41\). Now consider \(p_1 = 0.05 < \tilde{p}_1\). At this probability the zero-profit prices of ticket 1 and ticket 2 are 0.15 and 0.935 respectively, obtained by solving equations (5) and (6). \(\pi_{20}\) is strictly less than \(p_2 = 0.95\) and it gives rise to the highest bribe inducement price of ticket 1, \(\psi_2 = 0.255\); \(\psi_2\) is defined in (3). That \(\psi_2\) is strictly greater than \(\pi_{10} = 0.15\) implies that if team 2 is accessed it will be bribed. Further, that team 1 will not be bribed is evident from the fact that \(\pi_{20} > h_1 = 0.013\). Further, it is ensured that undercutting on both tickets and inducing bribery of either team, are not possible. Minimum prices to do so (\(\pi' = h_1 = 0.013\) and \(\pi'_1 = \psi_2(h_1) = 0.007\)) do not satisfy the Dutch-book restriction. It is also not possible to deviate to ‘no-bribery’ scenario, because \(\pi_{10} < \bar{\pi}_1 = 0.23\).

Also note that the zero-profit prices lie within the intervals specified earlier: \(\pi_{20} > \mu_2 \lambda_2 p_2 + (1 - \mu_2) p_2 = (1 - p_1^b) = 0.87\) and \(\mu_2(1 - \lambda_2 p_2) + (1 - \mu_2) p_1 = p_1^b = 0.13 < \pi_{10} < (1 - \lambda_2 p_2) = 0.525\).

In the two successive rows (in column 1) we consider two higher values of \(p_1\) (\(p_1 = 0.10\) and \(p_1 = 0.16\) respectively). With higher \(p_1\) the gap between the two (zero profit) prices gets narrower; \(\pi_{10}\) increases and \(\pi_{20}\) decreases. But in all cases \(\pi_{20} < p_2, \) and \(\pi_{10}\) remains
**Table 2: Zero profit, bribe inducement (of team 2) prices**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
</tr>
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<td>$\Omega_1=\Omega_2=2$, $\gamma=0.3$, $\mu_1=\mu_2=0.15$, $\lambda_1=\lambda_2=0.3$</td>
<td>$\Omega_1=\Omega_2=1.2$, $\gamma=0.5$, $\mu_1=\mu_2=0.15$, $\lambda_1=\lambda_2=0$</td>
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<td>$\gamma/(1+\gamma)=0.41$</td>
<td>$\gamma/(1+\gamma)=0.33$</td>
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<td>Bribe inducement range of $p_i$: $p_i &lt; 0.3$</td>
<td>Bribe inducement range of $p_i$: $p_i &lt; 0.45$</td>
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<td><strong>Zero profit prices</strong></td>
<td><strong>Prob.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>$p_1^b=0.17$</td>
<td>Constraints: - $\pi_f=0.24$</td>
<td>$p_1^b=0.20$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_2^b=0.83$</td>
<td>$\Psi_2(\pi_{20})=0.264$</td>
<td>$p_2^b=0.80$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Psi_3(h_1)=0.015$</td>
<td>$h_1=0.026$</td>
<td>$h_1=0.036$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_1=0.16$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_2=0.84$</td>
<td>$\pi_{20}=0.82$</td>
<td>$p_2=0.87$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_1^b=0.22$</td>
<td>Constraints: - $\pi_f=0.254$</td>
<td>$p_1^b=0.22$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_2^b=0.78$</td>
<td>$\Psi_2(\pi_{20})=0.264$</td>
<td>$p_2^b=0.78$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Psi_3(h_1)=0.028$</td>
<td>$h_1=0.043$</td>
<td>$h_1=0.047$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments: (i) At or above $p_i=0.17$ up to $p_i=0.28$ no (pure strategy) equilibrium exists. (ii) The bribe inducement equilibrium exists at all $p_i &lt; 0.17$.</td>
<td>Comments: (i) At or above $p_i=0.15$ up to $p_i=0.30$ no (pure strategy) equilibrium exists. (ii) The bribe inducement equilibrium exists at all $p_i &lt; 0.15$.</td>
<td>Comments: (i) At or above $p_i=0.12$ up to $p_i=0.45$ no (pure strategy) equilibrium exists. (ii) The bribe inducement equilibrium exists at all $p_i &lt; 0.12$.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
strictly less than $\psi_2(\pi_{20})$, confirming the inducement of bribery of team 2. Bribery of team 1 is also ruled out for $\pi_{20}$ being greater than $h_1$. Deviation to no-bribery is also ruled out because $\pi_{10} < \tilde{\pi}_1$. However, at higher $p_1$ beyond 0.16 one of the constraints will be violated and our proposed equilibrium does not exist.

Column 2 shows the effect of a decline in $\lambda_i$, while still representing the case $\tilde{\pi}_1 < \frac{y}{1+y}$. Here $\lambda_1$ and $\lambda_2$ fall to 0.3 and corruption becomes more costly. If punter $I$ bribes team 2 and bets on ticket 1, the bookies’ expected loss to punter $I$ will rise; to offset that they must get a higher expected profit from the naive punters. Therefore, $\pi_{10}$ must rise. At $p_1 = 0.05$, $\pi_{10}$ rises to 0.192. Here too we see that all the relevant constraints are satisfied to ensure that no possible deviation will occur to undermine the zero profit, bribe inducement equilibrium.

In column 3, we consider a special case, where $\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = 0$; that bribing will lead to certain defeat of the team. We also increase the size of the influential punter’s wealth $z$ from 0.3 to 0.5; this implicitly reduces $\Omega_1$ and $\Omega_2$ to 1.2 and $\frac{y}{1+y}$ to 0.33. Here we get $\tilde{\pi}_1 > \frac{y}{1+y}$ so that the relevant upper bound (for preventing no-bribery deviation) is $\pi_1^{M0}$ instead of $\tilde{\pi}_1$. Larger values of $z$ and smaller ($\lambda_1, \lambda_2$) increase the potential damage from bribery; for the same reasoning applied to column 2, price of ticket 1 increases further. In fact, it rises sharply to 0.35 (at $p_1 = 0.05$). Here, $\pi_1^{M0} > \tilde{\pi}_1$ in all three values of $p_1$ (0.05, 0.10, and 0.11). $\pi_{10}$ is strictly less than $\pi_1^{M0}$ in all three situations. All other relevant constraints are also satisfied.

In the last row, we note the ranges of $p_1$ (restricting attention to $p_1 \leq \hat{p}_1$) at which the bribe inducement equilibrium does not exist. We also know that there cannot be any other equilibrium. Comparing column 1 with column 2 we see that as $\lambda$ falls from 0.5 to 0.3, the range for the non-existence of equilibrium expands from $[0.17, 0.28]$ to $[0.15, 0.30]$. Further, in column 3 where $\lambda$ drops to zero (and also $z$ increases) the range for ‘no equilibrium’ significantly expands to $[0.12, 0.45]$. It is also worth emphasizing that if the bribe inducement equilibrium exists at some $p_1$, then at all lower values of $p_1$ (assuming $p_1 < \hat{p}_1$) the bribe inducement equilibrium should exist. This is an insight we gain from our numerical exercise. ||

**Example 2.** Suppose $\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = 0$, $\Omega_1 = \Omega_2 = \Omega$. Then $\phi_2 = \phi_1 = \frac{1}{1+\Omega}$, and $\hat{p}_1 = \frac{1}{1+\Omega}$ and $\hat{p}_1 = \frac{\Omega}{1+\Omega}$. If $\Omega < 1$, then $\hat{p}_1 < \tilde{p}_1$. As in Proposition 4, we consider $p_1 \in (\hat{p}_1, \tilde{p}_1)$.

Next, it can be shown that at the proposed bribe prevention equilibrium $\pi_1 = \pi_2 = \frac{1}{1+\Omega}$, each bookie’s expected profit is $E\Pi_{BP} = \frac{y}{2} \left[ \frac{\Omega(1-\Omega)}{1+\Omega} \right]$. Now consider a unilateral deviation from the proposed equilibrium by slight undercutting on both tickets. This gives an expected profit approximately, $E\Pi_{BI} = y \left[ \frac{\Omega(1-\Omega)}{1+\Omega} \right] - z(\mu_1 + \mu_2)\Omega$. Such deviation is unprofitable, if
Table 3: Feasible \((\mu_1,\mu_2)\) for positive profit, bribe prevention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter specification – Case 1: (\lambda_1=\lambda_2=0, z=0.25, \Omega=0.8\rightarrow)</th>
<th>Parameter specification – Case 2: (\lambda_1=\lambda_2=0, z=0.4, \Omega=0.5\rightarrow)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(p_1 = \frac{\Omega}{1+\Omega} = 0.44, \quad p_1 = \frac{1}{1+\Omega} = 0.56)</td>
<td>(p_1 = \frac{\Omega}{1+\Omega} = 0.33, \quad p_1 = \frac{1}{1+\Omega} = 0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\pi_1 = \pi_2 = 0.56)</td>
<td>(\pi_1 = \pi_2 = 0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_1 + \mu_2 \geq 0.167), and</td>
<td>(\mu_1 + \mu_2 \geq 0.25), and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p_1=0.45)</td>
<td>(p_1=0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq 0.087, \quad \mu_1 \geq 0.005)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq 0.155, \quad \mu_1 \geq 0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq -0.16 + 0.51\mu_1)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq -0.065 + 0.28\mu_1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \leq 0.44 + 1.42\mu_1)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \leq 0.31 + 1.60\mu_1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p_1=0.47)</td>
<td>(p_1=0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq 0.071, \quad \mu_1 \geq 0.022)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq 0.124, \quad \mu_1 \geq 0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq -0.19 + 0.54\mu_1)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq -0.05 + 0.35\mu_1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \leq 0.42 + 1.51\mu_1)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \leq 0.22 + 1.924\mu_1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p_1=0.5)</td>
<td>(p_1=0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq 0.048, \quad \mu_1 \geq 0.048)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq 0.09, \quad \mu_1 \geq 0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq -0.23 + 0.6\mu_1)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq -0.05 + 0.43\mu_1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \leq 0.38 + 1.67\mu_1)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \leq 0.11 + 2.33\mu_1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p_1=0.52)</td>
<td>(p_1=0.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq 0.031, \quad \mu_1 \geq 0.064)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq 0.06, \quad \mu_1 \geq 0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq -0.26 + 0.64\mu_1)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq -0.10 + 0.51\mu_1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \leq 0.36 + 1.78\mu_1)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \leq -0.01 + 2.79\mu_1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p_1=0.54)</td>
<td>(p_1=0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq 0.014, \quad \mu_1 \geq 0.079)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq 0.022, \quad \mu_1 \geq 0.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq -0.29 + 0.68\mu_1)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \geq -0.18 + 0.61\mu_1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_2 \leq 0.33 + 1.9\mu_1)</td>
<td>(\mu_2 \leq -0.20 + 3.50\mu_1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Feasible access probabilities

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\( E \Pi_{BP} \geq E \Pi_{BI} \) or equivalently,
\[
\frac{y}{2z} \left( \frac{1 - \Omega}{1 + \Omega} \right) \leq (\mu_1 + \mu_2).
\]

Further, slight undercutting on ticket 1 and ticket 2 each is unprofitable if \( \mu_2 > \mu_2^* \) and \( \mu_1 > \mu_1^* \) respectively, where \( \mu_2^* \) and \( \mu_1^* \) are given in (A.11) and (A.12) respectively. For this example, these critical values of \( \mu_2 \) and \( \mu_1 \) reduce to
\[
\mu_2^* = \frac{y[1 - p_1(1 + \Omega)]}{(1 + \Omega)[yp_2 + 2z]}, \quad \mu_1^* = \frac{y[1 - p_2(1 + \Omega)]}{(1 + \Omega)[yp_1 + 2z]}.
\]

In addition, to prevent large-scale undercutting condition (8) must be satisfied, which in this case gives rise to the following two restrictions:
\[
\begin{align*}
\mu_2 &\geq \frac{y}{yp_2 + z} \left[ \frac{1}{(1 + \Omega)^2} - p_1 \right] + \frac{yp_1}{yp_2 + z} \mu_1, \\
\mu_2 &\leq \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{p_2(1 + \Omega)^2} \right] + \frac{yp_1 + z}{yp_2} \mu_1.
\end{align*}
\]

Now we construct two sets of numerical examples in Table 3 and verify that the set of \( (\mu_1, \mu_2) \), which satisfies each of the above-mentioned conditions, is indeed non-empty. Two columns present two cases or examples each with a series of probability values considered.

In column 1, we set \( w + \alpha(f + f_I) = 0.2 \) and \( z = 0.25 \). This specification gives rise to \( \Omega = 0.8 \), and \( \hat{\phi}_1 = \frac{\Omega}{1 + \Omega} = 0.44 \), \( \bar{p}_1 = \frac{1}{1 + \Omega} = 0.56 \). Moreover, \( \phi_2 = \phi_1 = \frac{1}{1 + \Omega} = 0.56 \), which is equal to our proposed equilibrium prices. We then consider several values of \( p_1 \) from the interval \((0.44, 0.56)\) and show that at each of these \( p_1 \) values there is a non-empty set of \( \mu_1 \) and \( \mu_2 \) values such that no deviation from \( \pi_1 = \pi_2 = 0.56 \) is profitable. Since these prices exceed \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \), expected profit for each bookie under bribe prevention is strictly positive. Under this parameter specification one constraint on \( (\mu_1, \mu_2) \) that would commonly occur at all \( p_1 \in (0.44, 0.56) \) is \( \mu_1 + \mu_2 \geq 0.167 \); this ensures that slight undercutting on both tickets is not profitable. Then there are four additional constraints to examine, which will vary depending on \( p_1 \).

Consider \( p_1 = 0.45 \). There are individual restrictions on \( \mu_2 \) and \( \mu_1 \) to rule out undercutting on a single ticket, as given in (A.11) and (A.12). The other two constraints are given by (8), which rules out large-scale undercutting. The same constraints are then reproduced at higher values of \( p_1 \) in the interval \((\hat{p}_1, \bar{p}_1)\). As can be seen, in each case, the feasible set of \( (\mu_1, \mu_2) \) is non-empty.

Next, in column 2 we set \( z = 0.4 \) leaving everything else unchanged. As punter \( I \)'s wealth increases, \( \Omega \) falls (to 0.5) leading to an expansion of the interval \((\hat{p}_1, \bar{p}_1)\) to \((0.33, 0.67)\).
Condition $\mu_1 + \mu_2 \geq 0.25$ prevents slight undercutting on both tickets. Other constraints on $\mu_1$ and $\mu_2$ are derived considering five different values of $p_1$ from 0.36 and 0.63. At each of these values of $p_1$ the feasible set of $(\mu_1, \mu_2)$ that would support the proposed bribe prevention equilibrium is shown to be non-empty. Fig. 7 illustrates the case of $p_1 = 0.63$ on the $(\mu_1, \mu_2)$ plane for the scenario considered in column 2, i.e. $(z = 0.4, \Omega = 0.5)$.

**Supplementary material**

The online version of this article contains additional supplementary material. Please visit doi: ......


