In the wake of armed intervention and civil war in Libya, this commentary considers the changing ways that Libya has been represented in Western narratives. These include being part of a new ‘Roman Empire’ in Mussolini’s geopolitics, loyal pro-Western ally in the early Cold War after Libya’s independence in 1951, ‘rogue’ and ‘terrorist’ state in the 1970s and 1980s, then success for Western sanctions and diplomacy and subsequently commercial opportunity and cooperative partner in constraining African migration to Europe in the 2000s. The commentary develops the category of subaltern geopolitics. It begins and ends however with issues of memory and massacre: in Libya and Lockerbie, Scotland.

KEY WORDS: geopolitics, Libya, subaltern

Overhead aircraft can be heard, but not seen. A light drizzle falls, and I walk into a walled graveyard, on the road out of town. Some of the graves bear witness to past geopolitical action: Gallipoli or deaths in France in World War Two. A recent child’s grave has toys on it, a feature that alongside impromptu roadside memorials has recently become a more common marker of deathscapes in the UK and other countries (Maddrell and Sidaway 2010). Then I turn right and mounted on the wall is a memorial unlike any other in this graveyard on the road out of Lockerbie in southern Scotland. Two hundred and seventy names on the main stone, supplemented by some individual plaques.

The downing of Pan Am flight 103 came on the early evening of the shortest day of 1988. Tens of thousands of litres of kerosene and a falling wing exploded on Sherwood Crescent, Lockerbie. Bodies were scattered on roofs and gardens. Libyan intelligence officers were subsequently implicated. In due course, this led to the trial and conviction of a Libyan citizen under Scottish jurisdiction in a Dutch court declared Scottish legal territory for the trial. The conviction and early release on compassionate health grounds of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi have not quelled conspiracy theories regarding the crime itself. Whilst the geopolitical framing and consequences of conspiracy theories merit further investigation, these are mostly beyond the scope of this Commentary. Suffice to note at this point that the official UK and US position – confirmed in the trial – attributes it to the Libyan intelligence agencies. Serious doubts endure however, and plausible cases have been made for Syrian and Iranian roles.

* * *

Though different in their origins (coup d’etat in Iraq and Syria, popular revolution in Iran), all three regimes might be characterised as expressing a subaltern geopolitics. Joanne Sharp (2011) has developed this term elsewhere, in her editorial in a special section of Geoforum around the theme of subaltern geopolitics, and a paper referring to media coverage of al Qaeda and terrorism in Tanzania. As she is aware, the use of the term subaltern is the subject of a copious and contested literature since Antonio Gramsci adapted what was originally a military term used to refer to marginalised social actors in hierarchies of class and nation. Some of that original military signification might be retained, however, to characterise those regimes whose strategy is focused foremost on their own regime/systemic security, and whose geopolitical codes are defined by reference to such an understanding, sometimes blended with wider counter-
hegemonic visions and populism. This is most evident among ‘new states’ (Ayoob 2002; Calvert 1986), especially those post-colonies or post-revolutionary ones that challenge the prior status quo. For over four decades, Libya has been prominent among these.

The literature on the Libyan state has grown substantially since Ruth First’s classic account of what she termed ‘the elusive revolution’ (First 1974). Since then rich historical work on Italian colonialism and resistance to it has emerged in tandem with research on the nature of the post-colonial Libyan polity. However, the historical geographies that precede and underpin Libyan statehood were often elided in media coverage of Libya. Media representations have long featured personalised and de-contextualised narratives of Qaddafi as a ‘mad dog’ or ‘irrational’, and thus focused on the enduring and visible role of Mummar al-Qaddafi since he and other military officers overthrew the Western-established monarchy in September 1969. It is true that Qaddafi’s Libyan republic resembled a Sulta (monarchy), in ways that echo the Baathist regimes of Syria and Iraq prior to 2004. In all three, sons of the ruler came to play key roles in political and economic life. Indeed in Syria there was a direct father to son presidential succession. Similar prospects were being discussed regarding Libya in recent years. In all three states, populism and cults of personality differentiated them from the enduring imperially established monarchies (such as that in Jordan) or those who survived imperialism by dint of their remoteness (the Saudis) or through accommodations with it (Morocco or the Persian Gulf sultanates). Yet, in the words of an incisive Libyan intellectual:

[an] obsession with Qadhafi reduces the entire Libyan state and its politics to Qadhafi, with the result that Qadhafi and the Libyan Jamahiriyaa government are often seen as an aberration rather than a product of recognizable social forces... firmly rooted in the hinterland society of the Sanusiyya and the Tripolitanian Republic with their pan-Islamic culture, kinship organizations, fear of the central state, and mistrust of the West based on bitter colonial experience under Italy. (Ahmida 2005, 68, 71)

It is one of the strengths of Ahmida’s writing that he reviews the range of scholarly approaches to North Africa, and in the context of those lingering colonial histories. As an author of significant exposés of Italian colonialism in Libya, which transcend both colonial and nationalist historiography (Ahmida 2006), he draws on memories of the Italian conquest of Libya from 1911 to the 1930s.

From 1922 onwards, Italy became a fascist state, which until 1931 faced armed rebellion in its Libyan colony. Mussolini had ordered his governors and generals to quell the resistance by any means necessary. The archival records show that the Fascist state’s strategy was clear concerning the destruction of the resistance, even if this meant killing its civilian social base. They responded by forcefully rounding up two-thirds of the civilian population of eastern Libya – an estimated 111,832 men, women, and children – and deporting them, by sea and on foot in the harsh winter of 1929. The deportation emptied rural Cyrenacia and effectively cut off the resistance from its social base. Isolated on all sides and lacking supplies, the rebels gave up, especially after the capture and hanging of their leader, ‘Umar al-Mukhtar, on 12 September 1931, and the arrest and killing of most of his aides on 24 September 1932.

(Ahmida 2006, 181)

In Italian fascist geopolitics, the former Ottoman provinces, re-designated as Libya (adapting terms from classical geography), were to become part of a new Roman empire, by means of Italian settlement and planning and resting on the repression of all revolts and organised resistance (Atkinson 2000a, 2003 2007 2012; Fuller 2007). According to the fascists, an Italian province of Libya and other Italian colonies in the Mediterranean and Africa was the logical culmination of the nineteenth-century Risorgimento that had established an ‘Italian’ state with a capital in Rome (Cunisolo 1965; von Henneberg 2004). By the outbreak of World War Two there were nearly 40 000 Italian agricultural settlers: their land mostly granted by the colonial state, though facilitated by semi-public companies (Fowler 1973) and another 80 000 Italians living in the towns (Fisher 1953). The space envisaged by Italian colonialism became one whose fragmented sites of dispossession, colonisation, resistance and sovereignty could in turn be re-narrated by Libyans as a national, anti-imperial struggle culminating in the revolutionary rhetoric of 1969 onwards. It is therefore instructive to document how a series of Western representations relate to subsequent performances of Libyan sovereignty, whose machinations in turn might be interpreted as a form of subaltern geopolitics. This move builds on both established scholarship that interprets geopolitics as an evolving discourse (words and actions) that scripts particular sites and deeds as strategic (Ó Tuathail 1996) and that of sovereignty as reproduced through claims, acts and performance (Mitchell 1991).

It is impossible here to do much more than sketch what these amount to in the Libyan case. Illustrating them also demands consideration of how Libyan sovereignty and foreign policy encode and express local power and agency, reworking and responding to Western images of Libya. Reference to grounded scholarship such as that initiated by Ahmida is vital. Fuller accounts could draw on an earlier generation of research (such as Anderson 1986 or Davis 1987), including that dating from the late colonial period (Evans-Pritchard 1949; see the review by Shams-ur-Rehman et al. 2011) and Arabic language archives and publications. Whilst such detailed accounts are also
 Commentary

beyond the scope of this Commentary, it is instructive to list the successive Western narratives on Libya.

The first significant one of these was the Italian fascists’ map of a new Roman Empire; the geopolitics that was sought by Mussolini’s regime (Antonsich 2009; Atkinson 2000b; Minor 1999). This was imposed on Libya by force of arms. Indeed, a century ago, after its initial 1911 invasion of the Ottoman provinces in North Africa, Rome’s authority barely extended beyond some key sites. The period in which a conquered Libya was pacified through Italian imperial force lasted less than a decade. During this time, the 1930s heyday of Italian colonialism, ‘freshly unearthed ancient Roman monuments were described as being “liberated” from the accretions of Ottoman and liberal rule’ (von Henneberg 1996, 384). The Libyan desert soon afterwards became the key domain of World War Two battles between the Axis and Allied military, although histories of what that conflict meant for locals and the settler population have barely begun (Hughes 2011). Afterwards, until oil revenues commenced in the 1960s, the export of war scrap and receipts from British and American military facilities would be the largest sources of foreign exchange for newly independent Libya. Post World War Two Libya remained on the sidelines of Cold War and anti-colonial revolution; the figures of Nasser and Ben Bella in neighbouring states became Western bête noirs long before the 1969 coup brought Qaddafi to power. Libya was of marginal concern as a loyal Western ally and, at first a comparative backwater. Writing in this journal, W B Fisher claimed that:

Unlike some of the Levant states, intrinsic poverty in resources and inhabitants is not compensated for by a favourable location, which might act as the façade of a larger and more productive hinterland. Libya is unlikely to become a route-centre of the first importance; no oil pipelines cross its territories, and its strategic potentialities, though not unimportant, are less prominent than those of Egypt, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey.

(Fisher 1953, 183)

Libyan transition to statehood had been overseen by the United Nations in 1951 (with the exception of a swathe in the south that remained under French jurisdiction until 1954), adopting the favoured British imperial design for sovereignty in the Middle East: a newly minted monarchy (Kelly 2000). The compliant monarchy enabled US bases and British forces to remain. For the best part of two decades therefore, Libya’s post-colonial trajectory was exemplary in the eyes of Western powers and the dominant narratives of the time, not least when juxtaposed to rising tensions elsewhere over the status of Algeria, the Suez Canal and the tumultuous intersections of decolonisation and Cold War to the south and east. One of the accounts of this moment notes how, as the revolution-ary currents swept Arab states in the 1950s, and after the military overthrow of the Western allied monarchy in Iraq in 1958:

London’s immediate response was to order the destroyer HMS Bermuda [involved with the allied Operation Torch invasion of North Africa during WWII] with a company of Royal Marines to Tobruk.

(Blackwell 2003, 10)

By then however, it was evident that the King’s legitimacy was exhausted and dependent on external powers as his only guarantors. In addition to this the political consequences of the oil strikes could not be so easily contained . . . By 1970 Libya became the fourth largest oil producing country in the world.

(Blackwell 2003, 15)

After King Idris was deposed by his army (in that 1 September 1969 coup led by the then Lieutenant Qaddafi), Libya accumulated petro-dollars but garnered few outside supporters among the Leftist currents in the West that allied themselves with some social movements and Third World states deemed anti-imperialist. The Soviets were also wary. One of the few foreign radicals who did visit Libya then, the exiled South African intellectual and anti-apartheid activist Ruth First, registered understandable ambivalence about the new oil-fuelled anti-imperial republic. Yet First was critically seeking to understand Libya’s dynamics in a historical context (see Harlow 2004), something that was frequently stripped away in so much of the subsequent representation of Libya in the West. The more nuanced accounts of the Libyan revolution were replaced by depictions of Libya as a dangerous and/or unruly rogue state acting outside hegemonic norms. Indeed Libya soon became the archetype of rogue states (Zunes 1997), and the subject of a voluminous scholarly literature and associated discourse about terrorism and counter-terrorism.

These accounts interpreted Libya foremost as a state supporter or instigator of terrorism, frequently making reference to the personality of Qaddafi. They peaked in the late 1980s, accompanying US aerial bombardment of Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986 (using aircraft launched from the UK), and the later attribution of a Libyan responsibility for the Lockerbie atrocity. I noted three years after those US attacks how much of the media and swathes of the academic accounts of Libyan policy had become already analogues of ‘the “mad dog, flaky barbarian” imagery of the American anti-Qaddafi campaign’ (Sidaway 1989, 41). The regime’s subsequent accommodations (among them the trial of al-Megrahi, payment of compensation and commitment not to seek nuclear weapons) and rise of new narratives about other enemies and sources of danger saw a new genre appear in strategic writings; namely how Libya was
‘won’ over by the West (Jentleson and Whytock 2005; St John 2004; Newham 2009) and the role of pre-emptive actions. The latter rhetoric would reoccur with heightened consequences in the lead up to the allied 2003 invasion of Iraq (Winkler 2007). In other words, what factors underlay Libya’s return to a relatively compliant position? Could these be replicated? Whilst the jury was still out on the comparative roles of force and diplomacy, these debates were soon supplemented by Libya as commercial opportunity, not least for weapons sales (Zoubir 2009). Latterly however, a new threat discourse emerged: one about Libya as an entrepôt for the movement of undocumented migrants to Europe (Andrijasevic 2010; Bialasiewicz 2011; Lutterbeck 2009; Paoletti 2011). All of these, plus the bitter colonial histories, became the backdrop to an August 2008 agreement between Rome and Tripoli amidst grand gestures about reconciliation, although, as an Italian scholar noted: ‘Berlusconi with his characteristic tact, has openly and repeatedly described the purpose of the treaty as “less illegal immigrants and more oil”’ (Gazzini 2009, np).

As the revolts of the spring of 2011 began in Libya, one of the first statements from Qaddafi was about how Europe needed his regime to cooperate on border security and threatened that unless EU support continued, the Mediterranean coasts would soon see many more such migrants. Moreover, the US soon joined the European chorus of alarm:

> A scantly governed Libya, wracked by revolt and starved of revenue by external sanctions, would be unable to block transmigration, even as it produced its own stream of refugees. The southern-tier EU states cannot abide a ‘Somalia,’ as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton labeled the scenario of non-intervention, across the Mediterranean. Scarier still to the Western powers is the specter of Libya as Afghanistan or Iraq, or Somalia or Chechnya, a ruined land drawing radical Islamists from far afield to assist the jihadis among the Libyan rebels in their fight. The alumnae of the Clinton administration in the Obama White House are certainly aware of the history of jihadis operating in failed states. In fact, from the 2004 presidential race onward, recognizing and prioritizing the threat posed by such locales has been the very ideological edifice on which right-thinking (and right-leaning) Democrats have hung their political hopes. (Middle East Research and Information Project 2011, np)

Images of Libya as danger and opportunity multiplied once the uprising began in February 2011. But, as in the past, the Libyan subjects implicated in these narratives have made a history of not rigidly playing by these scripts or the roles accorded to them. Moreover, mixed in with these has been a new one: an emerging humanitarian crisis demanding outside military action, the stated rationale for United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the ensuing Western-led military campaign in Libya that began in March 2011. Three months in, the UK’s defence secretary stated that Britain’s contribution had cost £260 million. Sober voices noted that the figures ‘could be a heroic underestimate’, although

> There has been one certain winner in all this: MBDA missile systems, the arms manufacturer with offices in Stevenage, Hertfordshire. The company makes three of the weapons being used by British forces and has impressed the Americans and the French, who are both thinking of placing orders. (Hopkins 2011, 4)

At the time of writing, the longer term consequences of foreign intervention in Libya remain uncertain. Qaddafi is dead and his most visible surviving son, Saif-al Islam, languishes in jail: a marked contrast to Saif’s one-time playboy days in London, when he was a PhD student at the LSE (his doctorate from London may yet be revoked; evidently it was plagiarised*). Recriminations and revenge have followed and the longer-term direction of the new regime is unclear. China and Russia had their initial reservations about acquiescing to what was initially billed as humanitarian intervention in Libya, but soon became an undisguised effort at regime change. They seem determined not to allow such a mission creep again: in Syria, for example. Meanwhile, in Libya and its neighbours to the south, sporadic violence and rebellion continue, echoing a pattern that had earlier been evident in Chad and the Central African Republic. These places were themselves the domain of Qaddafi’s strategies and intervention in the 1980s and 1990s (the wider context to which is richly described in Nolutshungu 1996), as well as commercial and ethno-confessional links that pre-date the French and Italian invasions of the region just over a century ago (Cordell 1977). According to Marielle Debos, in the Saharan and Sahel territories to the south of Libya that became the post-colonial states of Mali, Niger and the Central African Republic,

> the trajectory of ‘rebellion-reintegration-defection’ is very common. Most regular soldiers are ex-combatants, while many combatants are defectors from the military. Combatants’ loyalties are extremely fluid…The reconversion of armed combatants, who may easily shift allegiance, is a structural pattern of the current conflict, which has major implications at both the local and transnational levels. (Debos 2008, 226)

In particular, already this year and largely away from the attention of the world’s media, in northern Mali, tens of thousands of civilians have had to flee from battles between the Malian military and Tuareg fighters with a long history of rebellion and border crossing (Kohl 2010), but have been recently re-mobilised by the return of combatants from Libya.
In the aftermath of all this tumult, will clarity emerge on Libya’s role (or otherwise) in the events that led to that memorial on the edge of a Scottish town? The legal process has neither decisively closed matters nor silenced alternative interpretations. Some commentators continue to point the finger of blame for those murders elsewhere: implicating Iranian and Syrian intelligence. The former, it is claimed, may have been motivated by the US navy shoot-down of an Iranian airliner en route from Bandar-Abbas to Dubai on 3 July 1988. The downing of Iran Air 655 killed all 290 aboard. Rather like Tripoli eventually came to regarding Lockerbie, the USA subsequently paid compensation to relatives of the dead, without formal admission of responsibility or apology. It is sometimes said that there were also shadowy links between Lockerbie and the 1980s Iran-Contra affair, in which weapons were being smuggled to Iran by American intelligence, in an attempt to assert leverage on the regime there, at a time when Iranian-sponsored hostage taking in Lebanon and involving the recycling the proceeds to the CIA-fuelled contras in Nicaragua. In a further twist, it turns out that many years before the Israelis had also shot down a civilian Tripoli–Cairo Air Libya flight that was off course over the (Israeli-occupied) Sinai Peninsula on 23 February 1973: 108 people died and again compensation was paid. Another bomb downed UA 772 on 19 September 1989 over Niger as it flew from Bazzaville to Paris. Libya was blamed by France and the USA and compensation for the relatives of the 171 people killed formed part of a larger settlement. These however are the story of another set of claims – and accompanying counter narratives. They all reflect acts of violence and the selectivity of memory and forgetting. In such contexts, it bears remembering how processes whereby some atrocities are marked and others largely overlooked are themselves a form of violence, in that they involve discriminatory amnesia and geopolitical cover-up as well as geographically selective memory, and that as critical geographers we should therefore seek to remember and reconnect the spaces, places, homes, and, indeed, graves . . . that have been thereby forgotten with those that are repeatedly remembered.

(Olds et al. 2005, 478)

Libya has not been short on either unmarked graves or suppressed memories.

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Notes

1 Correction added on 1 August 2012, after first online publication: the sentence starting ‘Joanne Sharp (2011)’ read in the original text “Joanne Sharp (2011) has recently used this term elsewhere, referring to media coverage of al Qaeda and terrorism in Tanzania.” This was adjusted to reflect the greater breadth of material that has been published by Joanne Sharp that has become available since the time this commentary was written.

2 An accessible account (and useful guide to further literatures) is St John (2012).

3 Many of the internal cleavages documented in First’s (1974) landmark account became visible in the fracturing of the Libyan polity since the spring of 2011 and during the ensuing civil war, international intervention (Pelham 2011) and its fraught aftermath. Ruth First would not live to see any of this however. Eight years after Libya: the elusive revolution was published, she was murdered. A deadly parcel bomb was sent by apartheid South African security services to her office where she worked at the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo, Mozambique.

4 Particularly thought-provoking accounts of the diplomatic contexts and consequences of the war have appeared in the London (Roberts 2011) and New York (Eakin 2011) Review of Books.

5 For strong evidence of plagiarism within the PhD, see http://saitislamgadda.diss.ku.edu/wikipedia/Plagiarism (accessed 10 February 2012).

6 The literature on Iran-Contra is voluminous. It is not hard to track down alleged links with what transpired at Lockerbie. All this remains unproven, but is sufficient to cast some doubts on the official story. Start with Miles (2007) and http://www.lockerbietruth.com/ (accessed 10 February 2012). Speaking of the Cold War, a few years earlier the Soviets also shot down a South Korean airliner (KAL007) that had strayed into their airspace. Although beyond our scope here, that event, with a loss of 269 lives, generated a voluminous literature for which Wikipedia is now a useful entrée.

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